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ABSTRACT 
Slithering towards uniformity: The international commercial arbitration and 
conciliation-working group of UNCITRAL as key player in the strengthening and 
liberalisation of international trade 
Solomon Wilson Kirunda 
LL.M mini thesis, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape. 
This mini thesis explores the role-played by the international commercial arbitration and 
conciliation-working group of UNCITRAL in the strengthening of international 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). It is argued that in enacting the model laws and 
rules in both the areas of international commercial arbitration and conciliation, and 
having adopted the Convention on Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards the working 
group is carrying out the manifest function of doing away with the various disparities that 
have for long existed in international alternative dispute resolution. In so doing, the 
working group is contributing to the attainment of the sole purpose for the creation of 
UNCITRAL, progressive harmonisation and unification of international trade laws. 
In a detailed examination of the UNCITRAL model laws, rules and Convention on the 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards the importance of having a uniform legal 
regime in the area of international alternative dispute resolution is established. It is 
further argued that the respect of party autonomy being the foundation on which 
alternative dispute resolution stands as exemplified in the examined instruments goes a 
long way in instilling confidence in international business persons that they have a say 
and choice in their destiny. If properly used the international ADR (most especially 
arbitration and conciliation as modes of dispute resolution) will soar in growth and 
subsequently the courtroom will be avoided. 
The UNCITRAL instruments and available case law are used to underline the urgent 
importance for all states to embrace a uniform and prejudice free legal regime if 
international trade is to thrive in their jurisdictions. A case is then made that doing away 
 
 
 
 
 v
with legislations marred with national prejudices will allow trade to transpire without 
feeling the effect of national borders. 
The mini thesis is concluded with the observation that the working group in carrying out 
its functions is indeed slithering the world of international arbitration and conciliation as 
modes of dispute resolution towards uniformity and thus strengthening and liberalising 
international trade. Lastly, recommendations are made which if considered would 
ultimately improve arbitration and conciliation and increase the international 
businesspersons’ confidence resulting in the soaring of international trade as a whole. 
November 2005. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The United Nations (UN) was built upon the fundamental principle of respect for 
international law. The preamble of the charter calls on member states “to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect of obligations arising from treaties and other 
sources of international law can be maintained”.1 An important aim of the U.N is, 
therefore, to bring about the implementation of both treaties and rules of customary 
international law.2 
 
Since the founding of the UN six decades ago, over 500 multilateral treaties have been 
deposited with the Secretary General. Without exception, all these treaties have been the 
result of meticulous negotiations and reflect a careful balance of national, regional, 
economic and other interests. In many instances, these agreements were actively 
promoted by non-governmental organisations. These instruments reflect aspirations of 
nations and individuals for a better world governed by clear and predictable rules agreed 
upon at the international level. They constitute a comprehensive international legal 
framework covering a whole spectrum of human activity, including human rights, 
humanitarian affairs, international criminal matters, the environment, disarmament, 
narcotics, outer space, trade, goods and services such as transportation and use of the 
seas.3 
 
In the UN system, various branches have been created to deal with specific problems. In 
this light, a body known as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
was put in place to design and prepare trade law instruments. It is important at this point, 
to note that though they may not really attract as much public attention as other 
                                                 
1 See the Preamble to the United Nations Charter available online at: 
 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-pream.htm accessed on 30th October 2005. 
 
2See: opening speech at UNCITRAL’s 33rd session by the under secretary for legal affairs, Hans Correll on 
the 12th June 2000, Pg 5. [Herein after referred to as: Hans Correll: 2000].Available on line at: 
http://www.un.org/law/counsel/uncitral.htm accessed on the 13th April 2005.  
 
3 Ibid. 
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international law instruments, they do indeed, play a vital part in the quest for 
international peace and security. In the past, the task of unifying, harmonizing and further 
development of the law of international trade was hardly ever mentioned with the UN’s 
efforts towards international peace and development. In recent years, however, we note a 
continuing and significant increase in the importance being attributed by Governments, 
domestic and international business communities, and multilateral and bilateral aid 
agencies to the improvement of the legal framework for international trade and 
investment, so badly needed in the era of globalisation.4 
 
1.1.1 UNCITRAL 
 
In an increasingly economically interdependent world, the importance of an improved 
legal framework for the facilitation of international trade and investment cannot be over 
emphasised.  That is why the existence of various disparities in international trade laws 
all over the world drew the attention of the UN. In seeking a solution to these disparities 
that were affecting the smooth flow of international trade, the United Nations decided to 
put in place a body with the specific task of harmonising and unifying the existing laws 
relating to international trade.5 This body is UNCITRAL.6 The commission has done this 
by coordinating the work of organisations active in international trade; promoting wider 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
 
5 See: Preamble to General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI)(which established UNCITRAL) of 17th 
December 1966 where in its inter alia stated thus: “having noted with appreciation the efforts made by 
intergovernmental and non governmental organisations towards the progressive harmonisation and 
unification of law of international trade by promoting the adoption of international conventions, uniform 
laws, standard contract provisions … convinced that it would therefore be desirable for United Nations to 
play a more active role towards removing legal obstacles to the flow of international trade … Noting that 
such action would properly be within the scope and competence of the Organisation under the terms of 
Article 1, paragraph 3 and Article 13 and Chapters IX and X of the Charter of the United Nations  … 
Decides to establish The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law”. See: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/005/08/IMG/NR000508.pdf?OpenElement 
accessed on 30th October 2005. 
6 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is a subsidiary body of the 
General Assembly of the United nations which was established in 1966 (Resolution 2205(XXI) of 17 
December 1966). In establishing the Commission, the General Assembly recognized that disparities in 
national laws governing international trade created obstacles to the flow of trade, and it regarded the 
Commission as the vehicle by which the United Nations could play a more active role in reducing or 
removing these obstacles. See: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.htm accessed on 4th April 
2005. 
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participation in existing international conventions, model laws and uniform laws; 
promoting the codification and wider acceptance of international trade terms, customs 
and provisions; promoting ways of ensuring uniform interpretation and application of 
international conventions and collecting and disseminating information on national 
legislation and modern legal developments, including case law.7 
 
UNCITRAL has since become the core legal body of the United Nations system dealing 
with international trade and is comprised of sixty members, all of whom are elected by 
the general assembly for six-year terms.8 In achieving the principle objective of its 
formation, progressive harmonization and unification of international trade laws,9 it has 
been availed with objectives to guide it, which include: 
o Co-ordinating the work of organizations active in this field and encouraging co-
operation among them;  
o Promoting wider participation in existing international conventions and wider 
acceptance of existing model and uniform laws;  
o Preparing or promoting the adoption of new international conventions, model 
laws and uniform laws and promoting the codification and wider acceptance of 
international trade terms, provisions, customs and practices, in collaboration, 
where appropriate, with the organizations operating in this field;  
o Promoting ways and means of ensuring a uniform interpretation and application 
of international conventions and uniform laws in the field of the law of 
international trade;   
                                                 
7 Shapira, ‘UNCITRAL and its work – Harmonisation and unification of international trade law’, (1992) at 
309ff. See also: Hercules Booysen, ‘International transactions and the international merchant’, (1995) at 62 
-62. 
 
8 The Commission is composed of sixty member States elected by the General Assembly. Membership is 
structured so as to be representative of the world's various geographic regions and its principal economic 
and legal systems. Members of the Commission are elected for terms of six years. 
 
9 As the "core legal body within the United Nations system in the field of international trade law", as stated 
in General Assembly resolution 37/106, UNCITRAL was given the mandate to further the progressive 
harmonization and unification of the law of international trade. See Hans Correl: 2000: 4. 
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o Collecting and disseminating information on national legislation and modern legal 
developments, including case law, in the field of the law of international trade;  
o Establishing and maintaining a close collaboration with the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development;  
o Maintaining liaison with other United Nations organs and specialized agencies 
concerned with international trade;  
o Taking any other action it may deem useful to fulfil its functions."10  
The law reform work of UNCITRAL is manifested mainly in conventions, model laws, 
and rules. It also drafts legal and legislative guides, and updates information on case law 
and uniform commercial law enactments. Its major law reform projects in the area of 
international commercial arbitration and conciliation have been the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration and conciliation Rules adopted in 1976 and 1980 respectively, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial conciliation, 2002 and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration adopted by the General 
Assembly and recommended to member States in 1985. The Commission has also 
assumed law reform responsibility for matters relating to the United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (New York 
Convention)11.  
Realising that as a commission it would be difficult to accomplish these objectives, it 
adopted a mechanism by which it appointed special bodies referred to as “working 
groups” to address concerns in various sectors in light of the principle formation 
statement of modernisation of international commercial law. Six working groups were 
formed12 and these included the working group on privately financed infrastructure 
projects; working group on transport law; electronic commerce; insolvency law; security 
                                                 
10 See: General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI) available online at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/005/08/IMG/NR000508.pdf?OpenElement 
accessed on 30th October 2005. 
 
11 Cecil O. D. Branson Q. C, ‘Recent UNCITRAL Initiatives Relating to Arbitration and Conciliation’. 
Available on line at: http://www.texasadr.org/uncitral.cfm accessed on the 4th May 2005. 
 
12 See: http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm accessed on 29th March 2005. 
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interests; and the international arbitration and conciliation working group, which is the 
main subject of discussion in this mini thesis. 
1.1.2 The international arbitration and conciliation-working group 
 
This working group, with the able assistance of the UNCITRAL Secretariat, 
headquartered in Vienna, does much of the preliminary work of the Commission in 
relation to international commercial arbitration and conciliation. It is comprised of 
delegates from each of the Commission member States, observers from all other UN 
member States, and invited observers from selected international organizations.13 
Observers participate in working group sessions on the same basis as member delegates. 
While the working group is in session, by custom votes are not taken. The preparatory 
work is done by consensus with the working group reviewing and approving at the end of 
a two-week session the report, which will go to the Commission. As the Commission 
delegates are part of the Working Group it is unusual for recommendations to be 
rejected14. This working group was set up with the sole duty of addressing the disparities 
existing in the available legislation on international arbitration and conciliation in 
international trade. In so doing it was tasked to come up with possible uniform rules 
concerning settlement of commercial disputes.15 As a consequence, UNCITRAL gave its 
working group on arbitration a broad mandate to asses the experience gained by applying 
the 1958 New York convention, with its narrow definition of an arbitration agreement in 
article II and its model laws on arbitration and conciliation.16 
 
The mandate was backed by an institutional mission, which recognised that persons 
involved in trans-national commercial disputes require an impartial, global network that 
is insulated from national prejudices. They will need to resolve their disputes efficiently, 
                                                 
13 Peter Binder, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions’ (2000) at 
5. [Herein after referred to as: Binder: 2000]. 
 
14 Cecil, loc cit. 
 
15 Freedberg J.A, ‘UNCITRAL working group on arbitration’ (2001) 3 Issue 1, p62, 2p.  
 
16 Freedberg, loc cit. 
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with confidence that the resolution mechanism they select will provide reliable, practical 
and impartial services.17 The lack of this, coupled with different and distinct laws 
applicable in the countries where the parties come from, have always sabotaged the 
process of alternative dispute resolution, especially in international business dealings. As 
such, the works of UNCITRAL have been used to instil confidence among the 
international business community to the effect that a reliable and practical way to resolve 
disputes out of court lies in arbitration and conciliation done under UNCITRAL laws 
which are uniform and thus stand to treat each of the parties fairly and equally. 
 
In the business world today, uniformity has become of essence. The business world has 
thrived on communication through all avenues such as televisions, telephones, radio, 
telex and jet propelled travel that has contributed to the business interests meeting, 
corresponding and sharing. Arbitration will not be exempt from such developments.18 
With such a trend prevailing, international arbitration and all other modern business 
administrative institutions will have to accommodate the increasing demand for 
uniformity.19 This is what was envisioned by UNCITRAL when passing the resolution to 
have the arbitration and conciliation-working group.  
 
Conciliation on the other hand, forms no part of arbitration proceedings. Indeed, the 
request for conciliation is normally different from the request for arbitration and the roles 
of both the arbitrator and conciliator differ significantly. Conciliation was considered by 
UNCITRAL at a much later stage.20 It was on the 23rd July 1980 that a report on the final 
decisions reached by UNCITRAL was tabled inviting the General Assembly to 
‘recommend the use of the UNCITRAL conciliation rules in cases where a dispute arises 
                                                 
17 Robert Coulson, ‘the future growth of institutional administration in international commercial arbitration’ 
(1982) 73. 
 
18 Robert Coulson, op cit 78. 
 
19 Ibid. 
 
20 Frederic Eisemann, ‘Conciliation as a means of settlement of international business disputes: the uncitral 
rules compared with the ICC’ (1982) at 121 is to the effect that at its 13th session in July in 1980, 
UNCITRAL adopted for submission to the 35th session of the General Assembly a set of twenty articles 
constituting the uncitral conciliation rules embedded in UN DOC. A/35/17. 
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in the context of international commercial relations and the parties seek amicable 
settlement of that dispute by recourse to conciliation’.21 In line with this, the General 
Assembly adopted resolution 35/52 on 4th December 1980 after being convinced that the 
establishment of conciliation rules that are acceptable in countries with different legal, 
social and economic systems would significantly contribute to the development of 
harmonious international economic relations.22 Even much later a model law on 
international commercial conciliation was also enacted.23 
 
By and large, it’s a realistic belief that the business community demands a practical trans-
national system of dispute settlement designed to its specifications with relatively 
uniform procedures. This clearly explains the reason behind the formation of 
UNCITRAL and the particular working group in issue – to unify procedures of 
alternative dispute resolution by way of arbitration and conciliation. This is because in 
such a setting, the nationality of the arbitrators [or conciliators] may be less important 
than their expertise and professional standing.24 
 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
With the modern day increase in international trade and commerce, national commercial 
law has often proved inadequate to international business needs and the resolution of 
disputes involving international contracts. This is mainly because international contracts 
typically differ from their domestic counterparts in subject matter, size, duration, policy 
                                                 
21 See: General Assembly Resolution 35/52 adopted on 4th December 1980 available online at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/conc-rules.htm accessed on the1st June 2005. 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 The Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation was designed to provide uniform rules in 
respect of the conciliation process. The Model Law was adopted by the Commission on 24 June 2002 at its 
35th Session in New York, and was published as Annex I to the Report of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law on its 35th session, Official Records of the General Assembly (A/57/17). See: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2002Model_conciliation.html. Accessed on 
01st June 2005. 
 
24 Robert Coulson, op cit 79. 
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considerations involved, sources of law, and with the participation of sovereigns as 
parties.25 These differences have served to lessen the confidence of the international 
businesspersons who may want to amicably settle their disputes. They are not confident 
that the laws existing in the countries of their business partners will treat them fairly. The 
question then is whether a unified legal regime to govern this branch of international 
trade would be the ultimate solution to the existing problem. 
In this spirit, the issue meriting investigation is whether the international commercial 
arbitration and conciliation working group in carrying out its duties has contributed to the 
attainment or fulfilment of the objectives envisioned in the setting up UNCITRAL. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The general objective of this study is to examine and review the main features and works 
of the arbitration and conciliation-working group of UNCITRAL while demonstrating 
their impact on international trade. However, the specific objectives of this research are 
to; 
o Examine the works of the arbitration and conciliation-working group of 
UNCITRAL while validating whether any benefits have accrued to international 
trade as a result of its existence. 
o Critically analyse and weigh the option of arbitration and conciliation as a 
medium of dispute resolution in the field of international trade. 
o Establish whether the existence of the arbitration and conciliation-working group 
has played a role in the attainment of the main UNCITRAL objectives. 
o Recommend ways in which the working group can better the works of 
UNCITRAL and in effect positively affect international trade. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 
The proponent assumption of this research is that the current regime of dispute resolution 
ought to rise above national and cultural differences in a sensible effort to accommodate 
the emerging demands of the parties. It is imperative therefore, that the model laws and 
                                                 
25 ‘General principles of law in international commercial arbitration’, (1988) 1820 – 1821. 
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rules put in place by the arbitration and conciliation working group be adopted 
worldwide. This is to pave the way for a uniform procedure of dispute settlement which 
is independent of all inequities in the current domestic legislation and have the pattern 
laid down in the model laws and rules viewed as ‘self sufficient.’ 
 
1.5 SCOPE 
 
The subject to be canvassed being quite wide, makes the current space insufficient to 
delve into all historical expositions of arbitration and conciliation. For the said reason, a 
limited scope is proposed. The study is therefore limited to examining Uncitral model 
laws and rules as the main contribution of the working group on international commercial 
arbitration and conciliation plus the enforcement of arbitral and conciliation awards in 
light of the arbitration rules, conciliation rules, model law on international commercial 
arbitration, model law on international commercial conciliation and lastly the Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.26 While the arbitration 
and conciliation regime consists of various terminologies, in this study the phrase:  
 
“Working group” is used to refer to the international commercial arbitration and 
conciliation-working group of UNCITRAL. 
“Arbitration rules” is used in reference to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules adopted 
under General   Assembly resolution 31/98. 
“Conciliation rules” is used in reference to the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules adopted 
under    General Assembly resolution 35/52. 
“Model law on arbitration” is used in reference to the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, 1985. 
“Model law on conciliation” is used in reference to the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation, 2002. 
 
As such, this study is therefore, confined to the features and works of the arbitration and 
conciliation-working group of UNCITRAL, arbitration and conciliation process and the 
                                                 
26 Commonly referred to as the New York Convention, 1958. 
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working group’s role in improving/ strengthening and liberalizing international trade 
while overcoming a clash of legal cultures. 
 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Taking into account the laborious exercise the working group is involved in, this research 
will inform academics, commercial lawyers and the international business community of 
its work and the effect it has on dispute settlement. The research will also inform the 
international business community that a reliable and practical way to resolve disputes out 
of court lies in arbitration and conciliation done under UNCITRAL instruments. This 
study will also serve to inform legislators that the future of dispute resolution in 
international trade lies in unifying the legislation picking a leaf from the UNCITRAL 
model laws and rules. In a nutshell, the mini thesis will be a timely contribution to the 
field of international trade. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
There is extensive literature on arbitration, conciliation, the working group and 
UNCITRAL as a whole. A critical analysis of this literature is proposed. It will also at a 
later stage in the study be necessary to compare the earlier regime of dispute settlement 
with the present one. The availability of case scenarios from various countries and bodies 
will provide a basis on which such comparison can be achieved. 
 
It is therefore viewed that a critical examination and analysis of the available case 
reports, model laws, rules, working group documents and any other literature available on 
the subject will suffice to give birth to a constructive conclusion of the study. This 
literature will be accessed from both electronic and hard sources from the library but also 
the Internet. 
 
 1.8 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
 
This research is comprised of five chapters broken down as below: 
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Chapter one:       serves as a general introduction to the study and to;       
o UNCITRAL and its objects 
o Arbitration 
o Conciliation 
- Statement of the problem 
- Purpose of the study 
- Scope 
- Methodology 
- Significance of the study 
- Review of the available literature on UNCITRAL as a body, the working group 
on international commercial arbitration and conciliation and arbitration and 
conciliation as remedies that are serving to strengthen and liberalize international 
trade while overcoming a clash of legal cultures. 
 
Chapter Two: serves to give an overview of various dispute resolution mechanisms with 
a view of establishing the most appropriate. 
      
Chapter Three: discusses arbitration and conciliation as methods of dispute resolution 
critically examining UNCITRAL model laws and rules as the main contribution of the 
working group on international commercial arbitration and conciliation.  
Chapter Four: studies arbitral and conciliation awards and their enforcement in light of 
the arbitration rules, conciliation rules, model law on international commercial 
arbitration, model law on international commercial conciliation and lastly the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (a United 
Nations convention adopted in New York prior to the establishment of the Commission, 
but actively promoted by UNCITRAL). The issues examined include but are not limited 
to the following:  
o What are arbitral and conciliation awards? 
o Process of getting them – role of the arbitrator/conciliator 
o Are they enforceable? 
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o If so how? 
Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
1.9 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Various views have been expressed relating to UNCITRAL and its working groups. The 
majority however, relate to its successes. This part of the study examines some of the 
prominent views that have been expressed in line with its principle function of 
harmonisation and unification of the international trade legal regime and in particular 
initiatives relating to arbitration and conciliation as mediums of dispute resolution under 
the umbrella of the international commercial arbitration and conciliation working group. 
A general applaud was given by Pieter Sanders27 when he noted that ‘the arbitration 
world is greatly indebted to UNCITRAL for all the work it has done on behalf of 
international commercial arbitration. First of all, the UNCITRAL arbitration rules 
appeared in 1976. Parties in international contracts frequently refer to these rules and 
states frequently do so in treaties. Also UNCITRAL’s model law on international 
commercial arbitration of 1985 was a success. Presently almost 40 states, [while] 
modernising their arbitration law, have adopted the model law. Several states adopted the 
model law also for domestic arbitration; Germany did so in 1988. The model law has had 
a harmonising effect on new arbitration legislations in countries which did not adopt the 
model law as such e.g. The English Arbitration Act, 1996 … finally UNCITRAL’s notes 
on organising arbitral proceedings of 1996 should be mentioned. These notes may be 
used as a checklist by arbitrators handling international arbitration’. This summation is an 
acknowledgement of the good deeds of UNCITRAL through the working group on 
international commercial arbitration and conciliation. Pieter Sanders categorically 
enumerates the principal successes of UNCITRAL, which according to him include: 
putting in place rules and model laws, which have in turn been adopted by many 
countries such as Germany. By so doing, he acknowledges the fact that model laws have 
also had the harmonising effect on new arbitration laws in countries, which did not adopt 
the model laws. An example could be drawn from Hong Kong, although this country did 
                                                 
27 Pieter Sanders, ‘UNCITRAL’s model law on conciliation’ (2002) 12 at 1. 
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not adopt the model law, whenever it’s confronted with challenges for instance in courts 
of law it always reflects and applies the provisions of the model law drafted by the 
working group in issue.28 So the importance of uniformity is that everybody gets a 
satisfactory outcome of the proceedings irrespective of nationality because the process is 
administered under universally accepted norms proposed by UNCITRAL, which is a 
neutral body. 
Earl Mc Laren29 on the other hand advises that: 
 
 When faced with the prospect of either filing a complaint for arbitration or 
responding to one, refer to the UNCITRAL notes on organising arbitral 
proceedings which clearly and succinctly outline the essential elements of 
the arbitral process 
 
This assertion points to the relevance of the work of the working group to the modern day 
business. As was desired in the formation of UNCITRAL, confidence is being won from 
all business sectors and authors such as Earl to the extent of advising the use of 
UNCITRAL documents in any form of arbitration. This has been aided by the fact that 
the documents in issue are viewed as neutral and unaffected by nationalistic prejudices. 
Bobette Wolski30 points out that UNCITRAL recognises that the absence of uniformity 
and consistency has an adverse impact upon the attractiveness and effectiveness of 
particular dispute resolution options.  Its latest endeavours are aimed at enhancing legal 
certainty and predictability in the use of conciliation and arbitration and, in the case of 
conciliation, it was prompted by its increased use in various parts of the world and the 
                                                 
28 Pursuant to the Arbitration (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance, 1989. This amendment made far-reaching 
changes to the Hong Kong Arbitration Law. These legislative changes came as a result or the 
recommendation of the law reform commission which considered the desirability of adopting the Model 
law on arbitration in Hong Kong. See: Fung Sang Trading Co. Ltd v Kai Sun Sea Products & Food Co. Ltd 
1991 MP 2674 at pg 3 of the judgment. 
 
29 Earl Mclaren, ‘Effective use of international commercial arbitration: primer for in-house counsel’ (2002) 
at 487. 
 
30 Bobette Wolski, ‘Recent developments in international commercial dispute resolution: expanding the 
options’ Pg. 19. Available online at: http://www.bond.edu.au/law/blr/vol13-2/Wolski.doc accessed on 20th 
June 2005. 
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desire to establish ‘internationally harmonised legal solutions designed to facilitate 
conciliation’.31  The Model Laws and Guides address a range of issues ‘where court 
decisions [have] left the legal situation uncertain or unsatisfactory’,32 including those of 
enforceability of agreements to conciliate and the enforceability of settlement agreements 
reached in conciliation.  
Furthermore, Fabian Von Schlabrendorff33 on the attempts to do away with the threat 
posed by cultural differences observes that ‘it is the strong current of legislative reform 
which is bringing about an even more uniform legal framework for arbitration in Europe. 
As there is hardly any reform project not guided by the UNCITRAL model laws, 
including the newest project to reformulate arbitration law in Austria, most of the issues 
concerning basic questions such as: arbitrability, interim measures of protection, 
applicable law, kompetenz – kompetenz, awards by consent, powers of state courts to 
review proceedings and awards, all tend to be regulated in a similar way with the 
consequence that the choice of the plan of arbitration is becoming less and less a matter 
of choosing between different legislative rules that apply to arbitration proceedings. From 
a point of view of a user of arbitral proceedings, it can nowadays be determined that there 
is no real significant difference whether such proceedings take place in Geneva, 
Frankfurt, Madrid, Paris or Amsterdam’. With the cited achievement, business stands to 
become easier to conduct across various borders with minimum fear among 
businesspersons. This is all accredited to the uniform regime that is being forged by 
UNCITRAL through the working group. As earlier noted34 this was viewed to be the 
ulcer eating up international trade, hence, the formation of UNCITRAL to combat it as 
can be drawn from objectives three and four to wit: “Preparing or promoting the 
adoption of new international conventions, model laws and uniform laws and promoting 
the codification and wider acceptance of international trade terms, provisions, customs 
                                                 
31 United Nations Document No. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.116, Para 8. 
 
32 United Nations Document No. A/CN.9/506, Para 3. 
 
33 Fabian Von Schlabrendorff, ‘Resolving cultural differences in arbitration proceedings’ (March 2002) at 
38. 
 
34 In the problem statement at 1.2 above. 
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and practices, in collaboration, where appropriate, with the organizations operating in 
this field; and to Promote ways and means of ensuring a uniform interpretation and 
application of international conventions and uniform laws in the field of the law of 
international trade”.35(Emphasis added)  
Jernej Sekolec addressed the same matter36 on the globalisation front saying that ‘… the 
benefits of globalisation are obvious: faster growth, higher living standards and new 
opportunities. Yet trade, services and investment can only cross national boundaries 
when the law crosses them as well. Traders and investors need to have the confidence 
that their property rights will be respected, that contracts will be fulfilled and that when 
disputes arise there is some agreed method of settling them. In such a global economy it’s 
vital to have clear, simple rules that everyone knows and applies’. (Emphasis added) This 
is the only avenue to successful international trade and so in trying to achieve it there is 
no doubt that UNCITRAL through the appropriate working group is playing a vital role 
in the strengthening and liberalisation of international trade while overcoming clashes of 
legal cultures. He goes ahead to note that ‘UNCITRAL has played and continues to play 
an essential role to facilitate international trade through modernisation and harmonisation 
of international commercial law. Some UNCITRAL instruments have become a 
landmark in the areas governed by them, such as … UNCITRAL model law on 
international commercial arbitration (1985)’. Looking at the role that UNCITRAL has 
played through its appropriate working groups, he rightly points out37 that by 
harmonising and unifying the law of international commercial contracts, promoting 
amicable settlement of disputes and removing legal barriers to the commercial use of new 
technologies, you help enhance legal certainty, reduce trans-national costs and improve 
the legal environment for international trade and investment. By adopting internationally 
agreed standards and solutions acceptable to different legal systems, UNCITRAL 
                                                 
35 See: General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI) available online at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/005/08/IMG/NR000508.pdf?OpenElement 
accessed on 30th October 2005. 
 
36 Hans Correll: 2000 at 1.  
 
37 Hans Correll op cit 2. 
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increases transparency and predictability in international trade and eases the way for the 
integration of domestic markets in the global economy. 
Indeed, as expressed by the Secretary General of the UN38 “… open markets offer the 
only realistic hope of pulling billions of people in developing countries out of abject 
poverty, while sustaining prosperity in the industrialised world”. But as correctly 
observed by Hans Correll39 markets cannot be truly open if the law creates barriers 
between them. Trade cannot thrive in an environment of legal uncertainty and disparity. 
Costs will remain high as long as no accessible means of dispute settlement are available. 
He applauds the commission and working group acknowledging that even in the narrow 
confines of its mandate it has made a remarkable contribution to overcome these 
obstacles. This speech is a valuable piece of literature that clearly points out the 
achievements that stand to sprout out of the works of UNCITRAL and the working group 
on international commercial arbitration and conciliation to both international trade and 
the UN as the parent body, in realising some of its aims and objectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 In an article published in the international herald tribune on the 26th July 2000. 
 
39 Hans Correl: 2000 loc cit. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.0 An overview of dispute resolution mechanisms 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A dispute was defined in the Mavromattis case40as ‘a disagreement on a point of law or 
fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between two persons’. More specifically 
however, J.G Merrills holds the view that: 
 
A dispute may be defined as a specific disagreement on a specific matter of fact, 
law or policy in which a claim or assertion of one party is met with refusal, 
counterclaim or denial by another. In the broadest sense, an international dispute 
can be said to exist wherever such a disagreement involves governments, 
institutions, juristic persons (corporations) or private individuals in different 
parts of the world.41(Emphasis added) 
 
The existence of situations such as the above described in international trade has given 
rise to various modes of dispute resolution. This is because of the development of 
international competition and communication, which has made the world a global market 
place.42 Advancements in technology, transportation and communication have made 
international business the “most significant, ever-growing and predominate aspect of the 
modern world”.43 Moreover, as states are becoming more interdependent, the number of 
international disputes is growing.44 As rightly observed,45 in this modern era of global 
competitiveness, international business must address new challenges, as well as rapid and 
                                                 
40 Mavromattis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K) 1924 P.C.I.J ser. A no.2 at 11 (judgment of august 
13). 
41 Quoted in Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘International dispute settlement’ 3 (2003) at Pg.3. 
 
42 Abbass Alkhafazi, ‘What a small world after all’, in 1 international research in business disciplines—the 
dilemma of globalization: emerging strategic concerns in international business 5, 6 (Carl. L. Swanson ed., 
1993). 
 
43 Abbass Alkafazi op cit 7. 
 
44 President Jimmy Carter, Jackson H Ralston Lecture: Principles of negotiation (1987) 23 Stan. J int’l L 2. 
 
45 Terence Brake et al, “Doing business internationally: The guide to cross cultural success”, (1995) at 2 – 
25 (discussing these issues and their effect on the global market place). 
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complex changes. This is because as the businesspersons seek to shelve the dependence 
notion, which has let the former domestic problems, evolve into international ones,46 a 
culture of interdependence has evolved consequently resulting in multi cultural 
communications, negotiations and other dispute resolution processes becoming an 
important part of day – to – day business relationships.47  
 
The growth of international trade has also led to an increase in disputes. In this light, 
various dispute resolution mechanisms have been put in place. However, each of the 
mechanisms has its own merits and weaknesses, which leaves the onus on the parties to 
weigh and choose the best mechanism. The onus on the parties allows them the chances 
to maximise an optimal strategy and achieve their goals in a cost effective manner.48 It is 
crucial however; that the parties agree on the dispute resolution mechanism before the 
actual dispute has arises. The rationale here is that before disputes arise the parties still 
have a clear mind towards the contract to which they attend with a lot of enthusiasm. The 
mechanism chosen will depend on various factors, including the identity and nationality 
of parties, nature of agreement they have entered into, and the type of disputes likely to 
arise there from. The options for the parties often include litigation in courts of a 
specified state, diplomacy with embassy officials (if the parties are states), expert 
determination, mediation or conciliation, mini trial, arbitration or some other process 
tailored to the prevailing circumstances.49 
  
This chapter, therefore, serves to give an overview of the options that will be available to 
an aggrieved businessperson in the international commercial domain. The resolution 
mechanisms are briefly discussed below with the aim of identifying the most suitable to 
the growing international commerce. 
                                                 
46 Terence, loc cit. 
 
47 Bernard A Ramundo, ‘Power and Law in international negotiation: The negotiators perspective’, 17 
Willamette L. Rev. 83, 84 (1980). 
 
48http://www.crowell.com/content/Expertise/InternationalArbitration/DisputeResolutionMechanisms/Dispu
teResolution.htm accessed on 02nd July 2005. 
 
49 Singapore Government, ‘Resolving business disputes’, available online at: 
http://www.business.gov.sg/manage/disp-index.htm accessed on 03rd November 2005. 
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2.2 Mini-Trial 
  
This is a relatively a new device for the resolution of disputes. Sometimes it is also called 
as "exchange of information"50 or senior executive appraisal.51 It has nothing to do with a 
criminal or any other trial. This procedure is only named as a mini-trial. In fact, in this 
process, no adjudication process takes place.52 Various national and international 
institutions engaged in ADR have taken to using it for resolution of commercial disputes. 
The institutions such as the AAA have proceeded to design procedures for "mini-trials".53 
The parties to a dispute can select and adopt any such institution and its rules for the 
resolution of their dispute through mini-trial. Either party to the dispute can commence 
the process of mini-trial.54 When one party invites the other party for mini-trial by 
sending a written invitation identifying the subject of dispute, the process of mini-trial is 
said to have been initiated. When the other party accepts the invitation in writing, the 
mini-trial proceedings are deemed to have commenced.55 If the other party rejects the 
invitation, then there is no mini-trial proceeding. This process is time bound and the gist 
of it all is to advice the parties on the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases. 
This advice is usually based on the presentations made by them of their respective cases 
to the neutral advisor.56 The said neutral advisor may or may not be an expert in the 
subject of dispute.57 The said advisor is at liberty to consult experts, if any, proposed to 
be produced by the parties. The important point with this mechanism is that it is aimed at 
                                                 
50 Vinod K. Agarwal, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods’ (2001) at 3. 
 
51 C Mark Baker & Arif Hyder Ali, ‘Alternative international dispute resolution: A cross comparison of 
international mediation rules’, (2001) at pg. 8. Unpublished paper presented at the ICC/AAA/ICSID joint 
colloquium in Paris on November 16, 2001. 
 
52 Ibid. 
 
53 The procedures are available for the use of any business organization or government agency. See: 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22007 accessed on 03rd Nov. 2005. 
 
54 AAA Mini Trial Procedures. See: http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22007 accessed on 03rd Nov. 2005. 
 
55 Ibid. 
 
56 See: ‘ADR World Observer’, available on line at:  
http://www.aryme.com/aryme/eng/metodos_adr/mini_juicio.asp accessed on 01st November 2005. 
 
57 C. Mark Baker, ‘ADR: Choosing the best process’, (2000) at 7. [Herein referred to as: M Baker 2000]. 
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facilitating the parties to gain insight in their cases with the expectation of entering a 
mutual discussion, which could result into a settlement.58 
 
The process of a mini trial as presented seems good but it typically requires a significant 
commitment of time by senior company executives and considerable planning and 
coordination.59 It also suffers a weakness of being used as a fishing expedition for canny 
lawyers.60 Another problem associated to this mechanism is that it is not decisive as it is 
largely dependent on the parties’ cooperation.61 This cooperation is often not availed by 
the aggrieved party who thinks he has a stronger case. Further, there is no set procedure 
of enforcement of the results of the mutual negotiations in case a party defaults on his 
obligation. 
 
2.3 Negotiation 
This is a process whereby interested parties resolve disputes;62 agree upon courses of 
action, bargain for individual or collective advantage, and/or attempt to craft outcomes, 
which serve their mutual interests.63 It is usually regarded as a form of alternative dispute 
resolution.64 The parties exchange views and proposals personally or in writing or both, 
whether represented or not in an attempt to reach an agreement by way of compromise.65 
                                                 
58 AAA Mini Trial Procedures loc cit. See also: C Mark Baker & Arif Hyder Ali op cit 9. 
 
59 Baker & Arif loc cit. 
 
60 ibid. 
 
61 Mini Trial Procedures, supra. 
 
62 Singapore Government, loc cit. 
 
63 It has also been described as a process of discussion and give-and-take between two or more 
bargainers/disputants who seek to find a solution to a common problem. See: Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, ‘ADR Unassisted’ available on line at: http://www.ferc.gov/legal/adr/continuum/un-neg.asp 
accessed on 01st November 2005. 
 
64 See: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Available on line at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/negotiation. 
accessed on 28th August 2005. 
 
65 C. Mark Baker, ‘ADR: Choosing the best process,’ (2000) at 3. 
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This definition shows that negotiation is part of every day life, from parenting to 
bargaining in a market place or ultimately in a courtroom. In this process the negotiator 
attempts to determine the minimum outcome(s) the other party is (or parties are) willing 
to accept, then adjusts her demands accordingly. A "successful" negotiation in the 
advocacy approach is when the negotiator is able to obtain all or most of the outcomes his 
party desires, but without driving the other party to permanently break off negotiations.66 
Negotiation is also associated with a number of weaknesses, which cause a problem for 
an aggrieved businessperson who is seeking resolution of his grievance such as; inequity 
of bargaining power. This inequity is always prevalent when one party thinks or is under 
the illusion that he has a stronger case. Such a party will make wild demands or 
ultimately frustrate the negotiation until the one with a weaker case concedes to the terms 
put to him whether they favour him or not. More often where one of the parties is a big 
corporate entity, their heart is not in a fair outcome for both parties but to do anything to 
save their corporate image. 
2.4 Diplomacy 
This mechanism is most used in situations where the parties to a dispute are states mainly 
through embassies or foreign missions. States tend to prefer this method to resolve their 
disputes not because it’s commercially viable but because it enables them save face and 
reconstruct their political ties with the other state. In the business context, this mechanism 
is less appropriate when the parties to a dispute are persons or corporate entities because 
they do not have access to the foreign missions and thus, cannot rely on this procedure. 
2.5 Litigation  
This mechanism involves parties bringing a civil action before a court in which the party 
commencing the action, the plaintiff seeks a legal remedy. If the plaintiff is successful, 
judgment will be entered in his favour and various orders may result. It may also involve 
dispute resolution of private law issues between individuals, business entities or non-
profit organizations. However, it may involve public law issues in those jurisdictions that 
                                                 
66 Mark Baker, ‘A better way to resolve legal disputes’, Houston Law Review VI at 78. 
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enable the government to be treated as if it were a private party in a lawsuit (as plaintiff 
or defendant regarding to an injury), or that provide the government with a civil cause of 
action to enforce certain laws rather than criminal prosecution. Litigation may seem the 
viable course of action for an aggrieved party but it also has its shortcomings.  
Seeking of redress in a court of law is effective but has been viewed to be very costly 
both in terms of time and finances.67 The progress of a lawsuit is often constrained by the 
differing procedural rules that exist in various jurisdictions where the cause of action 
might have arisen or where one of the parties chooses to seek redress.68 The details of 
procedure will differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and often from court to court within 
the same jurisdiction. The rules are very important for litigants to know, however, 
because they dictate the timing and progression of the lawsuit--what may be filed and 
when to get what result. Failure to comply with the procedural rules can result in serious 
limitations in conducting the trial or even dismissal of the lawsuit.  
Another problem associated with litigation is the differing cultures in various countries 
such as language to be used in court. If one were to litigate or to answer to a civil suit 
filed in France then he would need to know French or acquire representatives who can 
speak the language. This is burdensome on business persons who will have for example 
to file a defence in a French court and subsequently affect the outcome of the case. On 
the other hand if one was to hire French lawyers it would also be very costly in terms of 
hiring an interpreter. 
Litigation ends in judgment being issued. However, the way foreign judgments are 
treated differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This problem goes to the core of dispute 
resolution because if a judgment is not fulfilled then the other party has to find a way of 
enforcing it for example by seizure of property. There might be rules to aid enforcement 
of foreign judgments but with very stringent measures to be complied with which 
discourages business persons. For instance, if all assets are located elsewhere, the 
plaintiff must file another suit in the appropriate court to seek enforcement of the other 
                                                 
67 M. Baker 2000 at 77. 
 
68 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 23
court's previous judgment. An example of the trouble that brews in enforcing foreign 
judgments can be drawn from South Africa where the Enforcement of Foreign Civil 
Judgments Act, 32 of 1988 governs the enforcement of foreign civil judgments. This Act 
in section 2 (1) allows its application to judgments given in any country outside the 
Republic, which the minister has designated, by notice in the gazette. The only countries 
designated as required are the so-called TCVB states, which include Transkei, Ciski, 
Venda and Bophuthatswana. To these states there is the addition of Namibia. These states 
(TCVB) are former homelands, which no longer exist because of their inclusion in the 
modern day Republic of South Africa. The effect being that it would be very difficult to 
enforce a foreign judgment from any other country other than these non-existent 
homelands. It, indeed, begs the question of what happens in case of judgments originating 
from other countries. The considerations taken into account by a South African court 
faced with a foreign judgment were clearly enumerated in Jones v. Krok69 by Corbett CJ:  
 
i. That the court that pronounced the judgment must have had the jurisdiction to 
entertain the case according to the principles recognised by South African law with 
reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts (sometimes referred to as international 
competence); 
ii. The judgment must be final and conclusive in its effect and has not become 
superannuated; 
iii. That such enforcement should not be contrary to public policy;70 
iv. The judgment must not have been obtained by fraudulent means; 
v. The judgment should not involve enforcement of a penal or revenue law of a 
foreign state; 
vi. Lastly, enforcement of the judgment must not be precluded by the provisions of the 
Protection of Businesses Act 99 of 1978 as amended. 
 
                                                 
69 1995 (1) SA 677 (A) at 685B-E. 
 
70 See: Eden v. Pienaar 2001 (1) SA 158 (w). An example of something contrary to public policy in SA is 
the granting of punitive damages. This though has been interpreted to be dependent on the facts of the case. 
See: Jones v. Krok 1996 (1) SA 504 (T). 
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As seen above, the set conditions are reasonable save for the requirement of not being 
precluded by the Protection of Business Act (PBA).71 This provision causes a problem, 
which can only be circumvented with the minister’s consent if the judgment results from 
a transaction connected to mining, production, importation, exportation, refinement, 
possession, use or sale of ownership of “any matter or material” into or from the 
Republic.72 This requirement has proved to be so cumbersome because it virtually 
includes everything a businessperson can engage into.73 The fate of any businessperson 
here is put into the hands of the minister of economic affairs. Without any set 
requirements for such approval, great uncertainty looms as regards the minister’s consent, 
which is not good for business. This can be a difficult task when crossing from a court in 
one state or nation to another, though courts tend to grant each other respect when there is 
not a clear legal rule to the contrary.74  
Litigation is also cumbersome in the sense that it is filled with technicalities which can be 
used to stiffle a party’s quest to get redress. These technicalities range from filing of 
                                                 
71 This Act was originally designed to protect South African businesses mostly from the exorbitant punitive 
damages that are characteristic of U.S. courts. It was also to control the enforcement of some judgments 
that were given as a secret punishment for apartheid. 
 
72 Section 1 (1) PBA provides that, except with the permission of the minister, no judgment, order or 
arbitration award delivered, given, issued or emanating from outside the Republic and arising from any act 
or transaction contemplated in subsection (3) shall be enforced in the Republic. 
 
73 See: Chinatex Oriental co. v. Erskine 1998 (4) SA 1087 (c) and Tradex Ocean Transportation SA v. MV 
Silvergate (or Astyanax) and others 1994 (4) SA 119 (D) where the expression “any matter or material” was 
in issue with the latter case settling for the position that it means raw materials. 
 
74 This is what Mr Justice Gray while delivering an opinion in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 
40 L.ED. (1895) has described as 'Comity,' and gone ahead to explain it in the legal sense, as neither a 
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other but as 
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens, or of other persons was are under the protection of its laws. He goes on to allude that ‘[e] very 
nation must be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and extent of the duty, but of the occasions 
on which its exercise may be justly demanded.’ Quoting Chief Justice Taney he went on to point out that: 
‘[t] he comity thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty. It is the voluntary act of the 
nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests.’ 
See: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=159&invol=113 accessed on 02nd 
November 2005. 
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pleadings to the evidentiary rules which are filled with rigidity.75 The result of such 
technicalites is that either the case is thrown out prematurely or it drags on for a very long 
time at the expense of the client. Actually most business litigants tend to abandon the 
proceedings because of the financial damage they have on their businesses.76 
2.7 Conciliation 
 
Conciliation is being increasingly used in dispute settlement in various parts of 
the world, including regions where until a decade or two decades [ago] it was 
not commonly used. In addition, conciliation is becoming a dispute resolution 
option preferred and promoted by courts and government agencies, as well as 
the community and commercial spheres.77 
 
In pursuit of the above trend, various regions of the world have actively promoted 
conciliation as a method of dispute resolution by for example; establishing if not making 
the conditions favourable for the establishment of public and private bodies offering such 
services to the interested parties designed to foster the amicable settlement of disputes 
such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in the US, the Centre for 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (CADR) in Uganda and the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration in South Africa (CCMA). 
 
                                                 
75 M Baker, op cit 77 - 78 referring to litigation in the United States opines that extensive discovery, 
authorised by both state and federal statutes, is incredibly intrusive by the legal standards of other countries 
… Of course, there are numerous procedural safeguards and appellate protection for United States litigants. 
He goes on to say that ‘without question, fair and reasonable decisions are rendered everyday by generalist 
juries and judges. However, the failure to agree to some type of contractual dispute resolution process 
means that the future of a company’s investment, as well as potentially the company itself, is ultimately in 
the hands of individuals who have no substantial expertise in the area of the dispute. 
 
76 It has been argued that litigation is the most expensive, very time consuming, wasting vital business 
energy which can be better used elsewhere. See: K. G Mujawdiya, ‘Best way to resolve business disputes: 
An opportunity for chartered accountants in practice’, (2002) The Chartered Accountant at 173 see: 
http://www.icai.org/pdf/p173-175.pdf accessed on 03rd Nov. 2005. 
 
77 Guide to enactment and use of the UNCITRAL model law on international commercial conciliation, 
2002 Para 8. 
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Conciliation, which is sometimes referred to as “mediation”,78 is a voluntary, non-
binding; confidential and flexible dispute resolution procedure in which a neutral 
intermediary works with the parties to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement of a 
dispute.79 As Mauro Rubino – Sammartano rightly observed80 an institution that is not far 
from arbitration but certainly quite different from it in law, is conciliation. Indeed, 
conciliation is often confused with amicable settlements reached before arbitrators in the 
course of proceedings, which would otherwise be terminated with an award binding upon 
the parties. This is wrong because conciliation is no part of arbitration proceedings.81 The 
essential feature of this process is that it is founded on a request by the parties addressed 
to the third party.82 Important to note at this stage is the fact that the appointed third party 
assists the parties in negotiating a settlement that is designed to meet their interests and 
needs.83 Significant to the conciliation process is the fact that the conciliator is not 
expected to determine the rights of the parties; he is supposed to help or guide the parties 
to amicable settlement of their differences. This duty is only stretched as far as making 
proposals, which the parties are at liberty to either accept or reject.84 This third party 
should preferably be one who is in the same business as the parties or from the same 
                                                 
78 The difference between ‘mediation’ and ‘conciliation’ if any does not appear meaningful, especially if 
proceedings are confidential. The difference in most countries such as Canada is meaningless. So argues 
Eric Van Ginkel in ‘The UNCITRAL model law in international commercial conciliation: A critical 
Appraisal’. This view is also backed up by C.W Moore, ‘The mediation process’ 2nd edition 1996 at 161 in 
which he defines conciliation as a psychological component of mediation in which a third party attempts to 
create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation that promotes positive relationship and is conducive to 
negotiations. See also: Vinod K. Agarwal, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods’, available online at: 
http://www.unitar.org/dfm/Resource_Center/Document_Series/Document14/Agarwal/4conciliation.htm. 
Accessed on 28th August 2005. 
 
79 Baker and Arif, op cit 5ff.  
 
80 Mauro Rubino – Sammartano, ‘International Arbitration Law,’ 1990 at Pg. 3. 
 
81 Frederic Eiseman, ‘Conciliation as a means of settlement of international business disputes: Uncitral 
rules compared with the ICC system’ at 122. 
 
82 See: guide to the enactment and use of the Uncitral model law on international commercial conciliation 
(2002) at pg 10. 
 
83 See: A/CN.9/WG.11/WP.108, Para 11. 
 
84 Frederic Eisemann, loc cit; See also: C. Mark Baker, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: choosing the best 
process’ A paper presented at the arbitration and mediation conference, May 11 – 12, Austin, Texas. 
(Unpublished). See also: A/CN.9/WG 11/WP.108, Para. 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 27
background and therefore, armed with an independent familiarity with each party’s 
individual situation.  
 
This mechanism has a number of advantages accredited to it such as; the proceedings 
being confidential which helps in keeping trade secrets from the public domain,85 it is 
also less formal with the parties having a say in the procedure and its conduct since the 
principle of party autonomy is stressed in its conduct.86 Conciliation is also less 
adversarial since the parties submit to it voluntarily but and resulting agreement is not 
enforceable unless it is reduced in writing and the parties assent thereto.  
 
Another advantage also rests in the fact that the third party chosen to help solve the 
dispute does not have the authority to bind the parties.87 This allows the parties to reach 
their own decisions. In most cases they come out with business driven solutions hence, 
fashioning a ‘win – win’ resolution reflecting business objectives and priorities,88 which 
may not be available from a court or arbitral tribunal where the decision will be based on 
more technical and narrow issues. It is important to note that since conciliation is a non-
adjudicative alternative dispute resolution mechanism parties can walk out without facing 
any serious consequences as opposed to arbitration. In a strict sense, the parties always 
remain in control of the process:  the commencement of the process depends on their 
agreement to use it, its continuation, on their continuing acceptance and participation. 
 
Be that as it may, conciliation’s big disadvantage lies in the fact that, unless the parties 
sign a settlement agreement it is not binding on them. Yet without a signed settlement 
agreement there is no precedent created to dissuade against such or similar future 
conduct. Indeed, conciliation as a form of dispute resolution becomes disadvantageous 
                                                 
85 Baker & Arif, op cit 2; Confidentiality of the process is discussed in detail in chapter three of this work. 
 
86 Parties retain full control of the outcome of the process. See: Mujawdiya op cit 175; Baker & Arif, op cit 
3. 
 
87 K. G Mujawdiya, op cit 174.  
 
88 Ibid. 
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where a party is convinced he has a clear cut case, or where the objective of the parties or 
one of them is to obtain a neutral opinion on a question of genuine difference, to establish 
a precedent or to be vindicated publicly. 
 
There is also a lot of uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of settlement agreements. 
In some jurisdictions these settlements are treated as arbitral awards which makes their 
enforcement possible under the New York convention.89 In other jurisdictions however, 
the impasse of their enforcement has not been settled which leaves their recognition and 
enforcement at the mercy of the courts of law. 90   
 
2.8 Arbitration 
 
Arbitration has been defined as a form of dispute resolution in which parties agree to 
submit their dispute to someone or a panel of persons who will apply the same laws as 
would be applied by the courts.91 The major difference between this form of dispute 
resolution and conciliation is that arbitration has its roots in an arbitration clause or 
agreement, which, once entered into, binds the parties. The arbitrators derive their 
competence from this clause or agreement which is enforceable in a court of law.92 
Arbitration tribunals exercise judicial functions but enjoy no sovereign state power.93  
 
The most prominent advantage that arbitration has over all other dispute resolution 
mechanisms is the ease with which arbitral awards can be enforced compared to foreign 
                                                 
89 This matter will be considered at length in chapter four of this work, which mainly deals with recognition 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
 
90 It has been argued that the settlement agreement is a contract and an action for breach of contract may be 
brought if it’s not performed on either side. See: Baker & Arif, op cit 29. See also: Mark Baker, ‘The 
corporate representative and ADR’, International Commercial Litigation, (1997) at 37. 
 
91 See: Hercules Booysen, ‘International transactions and the international law of the merchant’ (1995) at 
367. See also: Richard Hill, ‘Primer on international arbitration’ 1995 available on line at 
http://www.batnet.com/oikoumene/arbprim.html accessed on 11th July 2005. See also Article 2(a) of the 
UNCITRAL model law on international commercial arbitration. 
 
92 See: Article II (3) of the New York Convention which requires all member states to respect and enforce 
arbitration agreements as long as they are in writing. 
 
93 David, ‘Arbitration in international trade,’ Deventer (1985) at 5. 
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judgments.94 This is all aided by the New York Convention,95 which will be discussed 
later in chapter four of this work. The main factor being that very few grounds are 
permitted under which an arbitral award can be challenged.96 
 
The second advantage lies in the predictability factor. On the one hand, disputes are 
foreseeable and thus some problems such as forum for the hearing of the dispute are dealt 
with before the parties turn adversarial against one another. While on the other hand, as 
Arif Hyder Ali97 notes, arbitration has sometimes been criticised for its ‘solomonic’ 
nature of arbitral awards. In ADR procedures, such as mediation, by contrast the outcome 
is based on the extent of the parties’ willingness to compromise, rather than being 
imposed on them. The final settlement, as a reflection of each party’s respective business 
interests and a consensus reached, thus has a much more predictable quality. 
 
The other advantage is that parties competent in the field where the dispute might have 
arisen render the awards unlike judgments.98 This is because even where the arbitrator is 
a legal expert and does not have knowledge of the subject matter he is permitted to 
consult an expert. In the use of arbitration the parties are at liberty to choose who to hear 
their dispute. They may also impose the credentials the arbitrator should posses. For 
example issues surrounding an information and communication technological dispute 
may involve technological and technical issues that are hard for a layperson to visualise 
and comprehend. But even if an initial understanding exists, lack of experience in the 
subject matter may result in the decision maker failing to fully appreciate all the technical 
                                                 
94 Arif, infra 23. 
 
95 The New York Convention is also helped by the principle of “comity” which generally provides that 
courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state or 
jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect. 
 
96 See: Article V of the New York Convention. 
 
97 Arif Hyder Ali, ‘Information Technology Disputes – arbitration and mediation as alternatives to court 
litigation’, A paper presented at the arbitration and mediation conference, May 11 – 12, Austin, Texas. 
(Unpublished) Pg. 12. 
 
98 This is important because under most Arbitral Rules the arbitrators must take into account usages of 
trade. See: John P Bowman, ‘International commercial arbitration: Advantages and Disadvantages’, 
(April, 2003) at 1. 
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issues or to consider all of the consequences of a particular determination.99 With such a 
looming dilemma arbitration becomes advantageous because the parties have the option 
of having an expert decision maker knowledgeable about the business, technical and legal 
issues that may be involved in the dispute, which can lead only to saving both time and 
money.100 
 
The element of finality of the arbitral award is also advantageous.101 The award being 
final and binding however, must originate from a clause included in the arbitration 
agreement. This safeguards against dilatory conduct by a party who does not want the 
award enforced since the only option he has is to apply for the award to be set aside, but 
still, there are very stringent conditions to be satisfied.102 
 
Arbitration is less costly both in terms of finances and time that would be expended in 
fighting a lengthy court battle let alone the enormous public relations expense to have the 
reputation of a company or business person that has been dragged through mad restored. 
Financial costs here are shared among the parties, subject however, to an agreement to 
the contrary.103 
 
Confidentiality as will later be discussed is one of the strongest points of arbitration and 
certainly all other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for that matter.104 This 
                                                 
99 Arif, op cit 11. 
 
100 Ibid. 
 
101 Mujawdiya op cit 174. 
 
102 Article 36(1) of the Model Law on Arbitration; Article V of the New York Convention. 
 
103 Although one has to pay the arbitrators and the arbitral institution, the legal fees will ultimately be lower 
because of the more concentrated, shorter proceeding, the foreign party does not need to instruct local 
counsel and the shorter the proceeding, the less time spent by management, an important cost factor. See: 
Robert Briner, ‘philosophy and objectives of the convention’, paper presented on the New York Convention 
day on the 10th June 1998 at the trusteeship council chamber of the United Nations to celebrate the 40th 
anniversary of the Convention on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards compiled under the 
theme enforcing arbitral awards under the New York Convention: experience and prospects Pg. 15. 
 
104 Arif, op cit 10. 
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serves to protect businesspersons from having their trade secrets splashed in public 
through a lengthy court trial which may attract extensive media frenzy. Actually even 
where an award is rendered against one of the parties the outcome of it remains a secret 
and thus not affecting the running or reputation of his business.105 
 
The flexibility aspect also causes a great advantage to both parties since they have a big 
say in the way the proceedings are conducted.106 This enhances party control and 
autonomy as opposed to for example national courts, which are strictly bound by national 
rules of procedure. The parties and their lawyers are availed with the opportunity to tailor 
their chosen procedure to suit their needs and preferences such as, what language will be 
used in the proceedings and evidentiary aspects as well. 
 
Last but not least, an advantage lies in not endangering the business relationship between 
both parties. A rupture of the relationship always occurs when parties have a go at one 
another in courts of law since each party is only concerned with winning the case as 
opposed to conciliation, which heals, even the little rift that may have caused the 
dispute.107 
 
A disadvantage lies where arbitration is final and binding it may be viewed as curtailing 
justice since in most matters parties would like to exercise their right to appeal to seek 
different and various opinions.108 Parties may view signing an arbitration agreement 
containing such a provision or clause as a waiver of their constitutionally guaranteed 
rights which will have them thinking twice before committing to arbitration as a mode of 
dispute resolution. Further, since enforcement of arbitral awards can only be refused on 
                                                 
105 Arif supra, acknowledging that a public dispute may have severe consequences for future funding and 
other business and marketing activities argues that ADR, in its sense, allows for privacy to resolve a 
dispute, avoid public record and judgment, and minimise the potential impact on the future disputes. 
 
106 This is mainly in designing the procedures to be followed. The parties has a chance to fashion 
procedures that are not “hyper – technical” and thus with few procedural traps. See: Bowman loc cit; see 
also Arif op cit 12. 
 
107 Mujawdiya, op cit 173. 
 
108 Bowman, op cit 4; Arif, op cit 15. 
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very narrow grounds that do not include errors of fact or law parties may be scared away 
from this form of alternative dispute resolution.109 
 
In the absence of a really broad arbitration agreement or clause this ADR mechanism 
may be a source of further litigation – [which parties originally sought to avoid] – at the 
enforcement stage with disputes arising over scope of the agreement to arbitrate, subject 
of the agreement and interpretation of the agreement.110 Courts may also be called into 
action where a party ignores the agreement to arbitrate and files a lawsuit. The other party 
will be forced to go through with a lengthy procedure of applying to compel arbitration 
before he can get justice, which in effect increases costs that the parties sought to reduce. 
 
Finally, another fact that stands to dissuade parties from using arbitration to resolve their 
disputes is that arbitration procedures are now becoming more legalised which is in effect 
killing the flexibility that served to woo parties to this form of ADR. This is mainly fast 
growing in the U.S, hence, exposing this ADR method to the risk of its demise.111 
Scholars who have argued thus have sounded a wake up call: 
 
International commercial arbitration has traditionally been ‘less formal, less 
legalistic, faster and more final than judicial proceedings’.112 It has also been 
less expensive than litigation in national courts.113 With the arrival of American 
law firms, arbitration has turned into a sort of ‘off – shore litigation’114 … 
discovery, depositions, challenge of arbitrators, simultaneous legal proceedings 
                                                 
109 Ibid. 
 
110 John P Bowman, ‘Dispute resolution with host governments: What the international petroleum 
negotiator should know’, (2000) at 12. 
 
111 Elena V. Helmer, ‘International commercial arbitration: Americanized, civilized or harmonized?’ Ohio 
Journal on Dispute settlement, (2003) at 35. 
 
112 Rau and Sherman, ‘Tradition and innovation in international arbitration procedure’, 30 Tex. Int’l L. J 89 
at 91. 
 
113 Hans Smit, ‘The future of international commercial arbitration: A single transnational institution?’ 25 
Colum. J. Tran Nat’l L. 9, 9 (1986) at Pg. 11. 
 
114 Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, ‘Dealing in virtue: international commercial arbitration and the 
construction of a transnational legal order’ (1996) at Pg. 53. 
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in various fora and tactical manoeuvres have become common place in 
international arbitration and a source of concern for European arbitrators and 
practitioners.115 International arbitration is therefore exposed to loose its well-
known or alleged flexibility and its traditional peaceful conciliatory character.116 
 
This summation highlights almost all the challenges that are coming up against the 
modern day arbitration and therefore when a party is considering an appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanism he should have this in mind most especially when adopting the 
governing procedure. 
2.9 Conclusion 
In consideration of all the above resolution methods, one finds that almost all of them are 
flawed. This therefore, calls for weighing the deficiencies and advantages that lie in the 
use of any procedure to resolve a dispute. It is however submitted that the above 
overview highlights conciliation and arbitration as the more appropriate methods when 
resolving international trade disputes. The justification of this opinion lies in the 
predictability, party autonomy to the proceedings and above all the strict adherence to 
confidentiality. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 See: Pierre Lalive, ‘Some observations in the internationalization of international arbitration: the LCIA 
centenary conference’ 52 (Martin Hunter et al. eds, 1993) while criticizing the “lack of international and 
comparative out look of too many practitioners who merely transpose into international arbitration 
proceedings their traditional national recipes and the ‘aggressive’ tactics they use in their courts”. 
 
116 Lalive, op cit 54. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.0 International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation under the UNCITRAL 
Instruments 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Generally, a contract will be governed by the law of the host country. This is not 
always as bad as it may first appear. The law of most countries is grounded on 
the equitable notions of commercial justice. It is not always necessarily unfair; it 
is the interpretation or application of the law that is often unfair.117 
 
The above summation gives a compelling reason for alternative dispute resolution over 
litigation. It also makes a case of ADR under UNCITRAL instruments because they are 
neutral and free from all national prejudices. On coming to terms with a world governed 
by rules, most nations have moved away from settling disputes by force in favour of 
adjudicative and non-adjudicative forms of dispute resolution.118 Indeed, many nations 
are disenchanted with litigation in particular because of its adversarial nature and the 
significant problems surrounding the recognition and enforcement of litigated 
judgments.119 Many nations mistrust the supposed neutrality of foreign legal systems and 
have as a result chosen and favoured ADR processes such as arbitration and conciliation 
for resolving their disputes.120  
 
Rising to this challenge UNCITRAL has, through the working group, decided to address 
the legislative branch of alternative dispute resolution by unifying the laws relating to 
arbitration and conciliation. The working group has done enormous work in improving 
arbitration and conciliation as methods that could be resorted to in case of international 
                                                 
117 Andrew B Derman, ‘A primer on oil and gas host government contracts’, 46 OIL & GAS LAW & TAX. 
7.06[5] (1995). 
 
118 Thomas Pricen, ‘Intermediaries in international conflicts’ 3 (1992). 
 
119 See Chapter Two above. 
 
120 See generally Abraham Ribicoff, ‘Alternatives to litigation: The application to international disputes’, 
(1983) at 3, See also: H Camp, Jr, ‘Binding Arbitration: A preferred alternative for resolving commercial 
disputes between Mexican and U.S businessmen, (1991)22 at 724 
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commercial disputes. Its main role has been to unify the legislation and provide guidance 
on the use of these legislations in international alternative dispute resolution. To achieve 
this end, it has drafted and enacted the model laws121 on arbitration122 and conciliation123 
(which are to serve as guidelines to countries that seek to identify with the international 
trend), the rules for both arbitration124 and conciliation125 (which are supposed to be used 
by parties who choose upon them for either ad hoc or institutional proceedings). It has 
also gone further to issue guides on the conduct of the processes in issue.126 All the above 
                                                 
121 These differ from conventions in the sense that they are only recommendations to states which are 
available for their adoption into their national laws. States entirely posses the discretion whether and to 
what extent they will adopt a given model law. The degree of harmonisation is lower than that normally 
achieved by a convention, but its advantage is that it gives states greater flexibility in adapting their 
national laws. See: Hanold, ‘Uniform laws for international sales under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention’, Deventer (1987) 5ff. See also: Booysen loc cit. 
 
122 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, [Herein after referred to as: Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration], adopted by the Commission at the 112th plenary meeting 
under Resolution 42/72 on 11th December 1985. The Resolution is available online at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/477/79/IMG/NR047779.pdf?OpenElement 
accessed on 30th October 2005. 
 
123UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, [Herein after referred to as: Model 
Law on International Commercial Conciliation], adopted by the Commission on 24 June 2002 at its 35th 
Session in New York, and was published as Annex I to the Report of the UNCITRAL on its 35th session, 
Official Records of the General Assembly (A/57/17).  
 See: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2002Model_conciliation.html accessed 
on 30th October 2005. 
 
124 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, [Herein after referred to as Arbitration Rules] adopted by the 
Commission at the 99th plenary meeting on 15th December 1976 under Resolution 31/98. The Resolution is 
available online at:  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/302/81/IMG/NR030281.pdf?OpenElement 
accessed on 30th October 2005. 
 
125 UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, [Herein after referred to as Conciliation Rules] adopted by the 
Commission at the 81st plenary meeting on 4th December 1980 under Resolution 35/52. The Resolution is 
available online at:  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/390/71/IMG/NR039071.pdf?OpenElement 
accessed on 30th October 2005. 
126 UNCITRAL Notes on Organising Arbitral Proceedings, 1996. The Notes are designed to assist 
arbitration practitioners by providing an annotated list of matters on which the arbitral tribunal may wish to 
formulate decisions during the course of arbitral proceedings. The text, which is in no way binding, may be 
used whether or not the arbitration is administered by an arbitral institution. See: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1996Notes_proceedings.html accessed on 
30th October 2005. UNCITRAL has also issued Recommendations to assist arbitral institutions and other 
interested bodies with regard to arbitrations under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 1982. The 
Recommendations are designed to assist arbitral institutions which are considering adopting the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules when preparing or updating their institutional rules, as well as in the case of 
arbitral institutions or other bodies acting as an appointing authority as envisaged under the UNCITRAL 
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documents will be examined in this chapter. This chapter will also concentrate on 
arbitration and conciliation as methods of dispute resolution under the UNCITRAL 
model laws and rules. 
 
3.2 Arbitration 
  
One of the most prominent ADR mechanisms preferred by business persons is 
arbitration. This is because it allows parties to avoid hostile local courts. In this work the 
term ‘arbitration’ will be used to refer to international commercial127 arbitration. The 
general rule is that for parties to engage in arbitration they must have agreed upon it in 
either an arbitration clause embodied in a general contract or in a separate arbitration 
agreement.128 An arbitration agreement is an agreement by which parties agree to submit 
to arbitration all or certain disputes, which have arisen or may arise between them. This is 
in respect of a defined legal relationship whether contractual or not.129 This agreement as 
a matter of precaution is required to be in writing.130  
 
Articles 7(1) and (2) as showed above give an extended definition of an arbitration 
agreement by recognising the commitment made by the parties. True, oral agreements are 
recognised in some countries but as a matter of fact they are harder to prove in case any 
of the parties deny ever entering into such an agreement hence, the emphasis on parties 
executing written agreements. As per the said provisions an agreement is said to be in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arbitration Rules or in the provision of administrative services of a secretarial, technical nature for an 
arbitration conducted pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1982Recommendations_arbitration.html 
accessed on 30th October 2005. 
 
127 The term “commercial” is given a wide interpretation so as to cover all matters arising out of all 
relationships of commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of commercial nature have 
been defined to include, but are not limited to the following transactions: any trade transaction for the sale 
or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency; factoring; 
leasing; construction works; consulting; engineering; licensing; financing; banking; insurance etc. see: 
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm accessed on 3rd April 2005. 
  
128 David, supra. 
 
129 Article 7(1) of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 
 
130 Article 7 (2) supra. 
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writing “if it is contained in a document duly signed by the parties or in an exchange of 
letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of 
agreement or in exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of an 
agreement alleged by one party is not denied by the other”.131 These provisions are 
largely based on article II (2) of the New York Convention. The United States court while 
interpreting the requirement to have the arbitration agreement in writing in Kahn Lucas 
Lancaster, Inc v. Lark International Limited132 held contrary to an earlier decision of the 
U.S Fifth circuit court of appeals133 that modifying the phrase “signed by the parties” in 
article II (2) applied to both an arbitration clause in a contract and to an arbitration 
agreement. Indeed, according to Professor Van den Berg, “the exchange of letters or 
telegrams implies that there must be a written proposal to arbitrate, that the proposal is 
accepted in writing and that the acceptance of such proposal is communicated to the 
proposing party. An oral or tacit exchange does not satisfy the exchange”.134 This 
assertion serves to point out the importance attached to provisions well agreed to by the 
parties and proof thereof, which can only be obtained if such agreement was documented. 
The evidentiary value attached to documents must have prevailed in the drafting of the 
provisions in issue in order to limit the instances where courts have to deal with the 
question as to whether there was an agreement to use arbitration as a mode of dispute 
settlement under international trade contracts. 
Having an arbitration clause as earlier alluded to, is where a contract for the sale of goods 
or services is drawn up by the parties and therein is a provision describing arbitration as 
the route to be taken in case a dispute arises under it. In essence there is only one contract 
                                                 
131 Ibid. 
 
132 186 F.3d 210 (2d cir. 1999). 
 
133 In Sphere Drake, Ins. v. Marine Towing, Inc 16 F.3d 666 (fifth circuit, 1994) the court outlined article II 
(2) of the New York Convention so that a requirement of a writing “signed by the parties” modified 
“arbitration agreement” but not “an arbitration clause in a contract” id., at Pg. 669. A signature is therefore 
not required. 
 
134 Albert Jan Van Den Berg, ‘The New York convention of 1958’ (Kluwer 1981) at  227 See also: Toby 
Landau, ‘The requirement of a written form of arbitration agreement’ (2002); Neil Kaplan, ‘Is the need for 
writing as expressed in the New York Convention and the model law out of step with commercial 
practice?’, 12 (1996). 
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encompassing all issues. Richard Hill135 stresses that arbitration clauses are extremely 
common in international contracts. These clauses however, if not comprised in a separate 
contract should always be broad enough to cover all aspects that are crucial to any 
negotiation as explained in Pennzoil Expl. & Production Company v. Ramco Energy 
Ltd:136 
 
Broad arbitration clauses … are not limited to claims that literally ‘arise under 
the contract’, but rather embrace all the disputes between the parties having 
significant relationship to the contract regardless of the label attached to the 
dispute 
 
As observed by Mark Baker137 the importance of a properly drafted clause or submission 
agreement cannot be over stated. Truly, where insufficient attention is paid to the drafting 
of such provisions, more often than not parties will find themselves fighting over the 
clause itself or resolution procedure that is to be followed before even getting to the 
merits of the dispute. Indeed, specifications of a good arbitration clause include but are 
not limited to: 
 
o Choice of law: this is the law governing the contract. It is the most important 
clause in international contracts and is normally an independent clause and 
separate from the arbitration clause. It should be noted that the UNCITRAL rules 
only operate as procedural rules while the onus rests on the parties to choose the 
substantive laws that will govern their contracts.138 
 
o Seat of the arbitration: This is another term used to mean the venue of the 
arbitration in case it is to take place. In this regard, it should be noted that parties 
tend to choose venues with laws that would favour them. Article 20 of the model 
                                                 
135 Richard Hill, op cit 2. 
 
136 139 F.3d 1061, 1067 (fifth cir. 1998). 
 
137 C. Mark Baker, ‘Mediation: a valuable partner to international arbitration’ (2003) 2. 
 
138 See article 28(1) and (2) of the Model Law on International Arbitration. 
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law and article 16 of the rules give the parties authority to choose any place of 
their choice. This right can only be lost where parties fail to agree. In such a case, 
the arbitration tribunal assumes the authority to do so. Despite assuming the 
jurisdiction to choose for the parties the tribunal must take into account all 
circumstances relevant to the case including convenience of the parties. Choosing 
a seat does not prevent the tribunal from meeting in a different place for purposes 
of consultation, hearing witnesses, hearing experts or parties or for inspection of 
goods, other property or documents unless the parties agreed otherwise.139 Of 
primary importance in taking this measure is that the arbitrators in order for them 
to secure their attendance or presence give both parties notice.140 
 
o The language in which proceedings will be conducted should also be catered for 
in the clause. The parties are still at liberty to choose and failure to exercise this 
right will prompt the tribunal to embrace the jurisdiction so to do on their behalf. 
The agreement on the language by the parties or the tribunal on their behalf 
applies to the hearing, any statement by a party and any award, decision or other 
communication by the tribunal. The essence of this is to ensure that all parties are 
in position to follow proceedings and prepare a solid case to lead to a fair result 
without prejudicing any party hence, eliminating the unfair advantage that would 
be created in case one party didn’t understand the language of the proceedings.141 
In fact, for purposes of enhancing the understanding of both parties the tribunal 
has the authority to order a translation of all documents tendered before it.142  
 
                                                 
139 Article 20(2) Model Law and Article 16(3) Arbitration Rules. 
  
140 Article 16(3) Arbitration Rules. 
 
141 Article 17(1) Arbitration Rules. 
 
142 Article 22(2) Model Law and Article 16(2) Arbitration Rules. 
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o The number of the arbitrators should be specified i.e. it helps avoid controversy as 
to the number and nomination procedure and prevents the party assuming to have 
a better case from calling the shots.143 
All the above considerations if put into effect by parties drawing arbitration agreements 
or clauses for that matter should save both parties the inconvenience in case of a dispute 
which needs to be settled. The above cited points of consideration while drafting an 
arbitration clause or agreement can be well illustrated in a properly drawn decision tree to 
guide parties better. 
3.2.1 Decision Tree for Drafting a Dispute Resolution Clause 
                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
143 However, where parties fail to agree the tribunal to be appointed shall have three arbitrators. See: Article 
10 of the Model Law. 
Pre dispute contractual clause or 
agreement 
Ad hoc or institutional procedures 
Single or multi step procedure 
All or certain disputes 
One or more decision makers 
Which method:  
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The above decision tree is adopted from C. Mark Baker144 and serves to illustrate some of 
the most salient aspects that should be considered when drafting or recommending a 
dispute resolution clause or submission agreement, in context of an international 
relationship. Following this tree is not mandatory but can be done ‘mutatis mutandis’. 
 
Guidance is also provided in the auspices of Article 1 of the arbitration rules which 
provides a model arbitration clause to wit: 
 
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or 
the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in 
accordance with the UNCITRAL arbitration rules as at present in force145 
 
This clause is aimed at guiding parties but it falls short of highlighting what the parties 
ought to consider while adopting it or clearly drafting an independent arbitration clause 
or agreement. Clearly, it’s not enough to merely state that “disputes arising under the 
contract shall be settled by arbitration” because while the language indicates the parties 
willingness to arbitrate any dispute and may authorise the court to enforce such intention 
it leaves many issues unresolved. Issues such as when, where, how and before whom the 
dispute will be arbitrated may be subject to disagreement once a dispute has arisen which 
may in turn leave the parties with no way to resolve them except by going to court. 
Something they originally sought to avoid.146 This emphasises the need to draft carefully, 
comprehensively and indeed exhaustively in order not to leave any room for doubt or 
scepticism, which would only give rise to unwarranted litigation and subsequent 
inconvenience. Realistically, a dispute resolution clause if well drafted might expedite the 
peaceful settlement without the necessity of going to arbitration at all. Thus, an 
                                                 
144 Mark Baker op cit 3. 
 
145 A note is also given of the items that may be included in the said agreement such as: 
 
(a) The appointing authority shall be … (name of institution or person) 
(b) The place of arbitration shall be … (city or country) 
(c) What the language(s) to be used in the arbitration proceedings shall be … 
 
146 Agnes Wilson, ‘Drafting dispute resolution clauses – A practical guide’ 13 PLI/ NY 19 (1998). 
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arbitration clause is a form of insurance against loss of good will.147 It should also be 
noted that a well drafted arbitration clause or agreement to arbitrate is the sole foundation 
of a stress free and fruitful arbitration because it is practically self executing in the sense 
that it does away with any curiosity relating to what to do, when to do it and where. 
Conclusively, the requirement of having all i’s dotted and all t’s crossed while drafting an 
arbitration clause or agreement can’t be better emphasised than was by Agnes Wilson in 
holding the view that: 
 
A dispute resolution clause should address all the special needs of the parties 
involved. An inadequate ADR clause can produce as much delay, expense and 
inconvenience as a traditional lawsuit. When writing a dispute resolution clause, 
keep in mind that its purpose is to resolve disputes and not to create them. If 
disagreements arise over the meaning of the clause its often because it failed to 
address the particular needs of the parties … drafting an effective ADR 
agreement is the first step on the road to successful dispute resolution.148   
 
 
3.2.2 Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings 
 
Upon a dispute arising out of a contract the party desiring to get redress through 
arbitration usually referred to as “the claimant” commences the process by giving a 
notice of arbitration to the other party normally referred to as “the respondent”. The 
arbitral proceedings shall be deemed to have commenced upon receipt of communication 
by the respondent.149 Such privilege as to serving of the notice is unlike in litigation 
limited to the parties to the agreement. That is to say, arbitration can neither be 
commenced against nor can a person who is not a party to the agreement initiate it.150 
The notice should demand that the dispute be referred to arbitration. It must include the 
                                                 
147 Agnes Wilson, op cit 3. 
 
148 Agnes Wilson op cit 15. 
 
149 Article 3 (1) and (2) Arbitration Rules. 
 
150 Arif Hyder Ali, ‘Information and communication technology disputes – arbitration and mediation 
alternatives to court litigation’, (2003)21. 
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names and addresses of the parties, reference to the arbitration clause or separate 
arbitration agreement, a reference to the contract out of which a dispute arises, nature of 
claim and an indication as to the amounts involved. It must also include the remedy or 
relief sought, and proposal as to the number of arbitrators if they had not previously been 
agreed upon.151 This notice essentially serves to notify the respondent of where the 
arbitration is to take place and the nature of the case he is faced with to enable him or her 
to make adequate preparation and consequently furnish a defence to the claim against 
him or her.152 
 
3.2.3 Appointment of Arbitrators 
 
As earlier pointed out, arbitrators are to be agreed upon by the parties as per the 
agreement to arbitrate. The agreement is required to specify the numbers of arbitrators to 
be appointed but normally it is either one or three. In case the agreement provides for 
three arbitrators each of the parties shall appoint one arbitrator and the third one shall be 
agreed upon and appointed by the two already appointed arbitrators. However, if one 
party fails or neglects to appoint an arbitrator or the two already chosen fail to agree on 
who to appoint as the third arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of the request so to do 
or within thirty days of their appointment then the aggrieved party shall seek court 
intervention in appointing the arbitrator.153 This issue was examined in Pacific Int. Lines 
(pte) Ltd and Another v. Tsinlien Metals and Minerals Co. Ltd154 where the high court of 
Hong Kong concluded that article 7 of the model law had been complied with and gave 
the defendant seven days within which to appoint a second arbitrator, otherwise the court 
would appoint one on his behalf. Indeed, in Oonc Lines Limited v. Sino – American 
                                                 
151 Article 1 (3) Arbitration Rules. 
 
152 The notice of arbitration is what is referred to in article 23 (1) of the Model Law as the ‘statement of 
claim’. 
 
153 The court is empowered to do so under article 6 of the model law. The court can be moved so to do by 
an aggrieved party under article 11 (4) of the model law. 
 
154 Published in English in 1992, Hong Kong law digest 5 excepts of the judgment can be found in 
arbitration and dispute resolution journal, part 4, December 1992, 240, [1993] 2 HKLR 249. 
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Trade Advancement Co. Ltd155 the plaintiff requested court to appoint an arbitrator on 
behalf of the defendant in pursuant to article 11 of the model law. The defendant objected 
on the ground that article 7(2) had not been complied with since the defendant had not 
signed the charter party that contained in a rider the arbitration agreement invoked by the 
plaintiff. Kaplan J found that even though either party had not signed the charter party, a 
number of communications had been exchanged between the parties that provided 
sufficient record in writing of the agreement to arbitrate. He then went ahead to appoint 
an arbitrator on behalf of the defendant. 
 
The two cited authorities serve to exemplify the fact that even though a party disputes the 
arbitration agreement he has to appoint an arbitrator and once the arbitration tribunal is 
properly constituted, he can go ahead and raise his objection upon which the tribunal 
shall rule. 
 
3.2.4 Challenge of Arbitrators 
 
The parties are undoubtedly allowed a great deal of latitude when it comes to the 
appointment of arbitrators. Despite the freedom to appoint arbitrators of their choice 
however, the appointment by one party can be challenged by the other mostly if there are 
circumstances that put the impartiality or independence of the arbitrator in question.156 
However, the grounds for such a challenge should have come to light after the 
appointment of the arbitrator in issue.157 The challenge must be founded in a notice in 
writing and within fifteen days after the appointment in issue158 with the reasons for such 
challenge clearly stipulated.159 Upon receipt of such notice of challenge the arbitrator 
may withdraw from office, which will pave way for the appointment of a substitute 
                                                 
155 In the supreme court of Hong Kong, High court miscellaneous proceedings no. 50/94. 
 
156 Article 10 (1) Arbitration Rules and Article 12 (1) of the Model Law. Another reason for which the 
appointment of an arbitrator can be challenged can be if he doesn’t posses the necessary qualifications. 
 
157 Article 10 (2) Arbitration Rules and Article 12 (2) Model Law. 
 
158 Article 11 (1) Arbitration Rules. 
 
159 Article 11 (2) Arbitration Rules, Article 13(4) Model Law. 
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arbitrator. This withdrawal however, does not and should not be interpreted to connote 
acceptance of the validity of the grounds of the challenge.160 Of importance however, is 
the fact that the arbitration rules leave a gap as to what happens if the party who 
appointed the disputed arbitrator refused to acknowledge the challenge consequently, 
leading to the failure to withdraw by the disputed arbitrator. What is dealt with by article 
12 of the arbitration rules only reflects a situation if the appointment was done by an 
appointing authority and thus, begs the questions as to what happens if the appointment 
was done individually? This lacuna was envisaged later hence, the enactment of article 
13 (3) of the model law which allows the disputing party to seek court intervention 
within thirty days of receiving the notice of the decision to reject the challenge. The 
decision of the court in this matter shall be final and binding i.e. the decision will not be 
subject to appeal. The same provision uniquely allows the arbitral tribunal, including the 
challenged arbitrator to continue with the arbitration proceedings whilst the matter is 
pending in the courts to the extent of even making an award. 
 
3.2.5 Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal 
 
 
The jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal at the onset derives from the arbitration 
agreement or clause entered into by the parties. The arbitral tribunal is mandated to rule 
on inter alia; its own jurisdiction,161 any objections as to the existence or validity of the 
arbitration agreement,162 the existence or validity of the contract of which the arbitration 
clause forms part.163 
 
                                                 
160 Article 11 (3) Arbitration rules. 
 
161 Article 16 (1) Model Law and Article 21 (1) Arbitration Rules. 
 
162 Article 16 (1) Model Law and Article 21 (1) Arbitration Rules. 
 
163 Article 21 (2) Arbitration Rules. 
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3.2.5.1 Own Jurisdiction 
 
In both the rules and the model law we establish that arbitration tribunals have been 
empowered with the competence to rule on their own jurisdiction. This is what has 
grown to be known as the doctrine of competence – competence164 i.e. arbitrators have 
the jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction, at least as a preliminary matter.165  
This is mostly challenged by one of the parties or when members of the tribunal feel the 
matters in issue are beyond their authority. Objections as regards the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal should always be raised at the earliest possible time so that they can be 
addressed.166 The competence to rule on the very foundation of the tribunal’s mandate 
and power is subject to court control most especially if the tribunal finds itself with 
competent jurisdiction. In such a case, the aggrieved party is empowered to seek redress 
within thirty days of receiving the ruling. The court’s decision will of course be final and 
binding.167 This is designed to protect a party who may be falling prey to another’s 
dilatory tactics coated in endless and frivolous litigation. Indeed, this matter was 
considered in Fung Sang Trading Ltd. V. Kai Sun Sea Products Co. Ltd.168 the court 
positively held thus; “each case will depend on its own particular facts. One thing is clear 
however; arbitrators should pull down the curtains as soon as one party objects to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal. The arbitrator can rule on the question as to whether he has 
jurisdiction but he can’t make a final and binding declaration on that issue as the matter 
can always be taken to court either by direct challenge or at setting aside or enforcement 
stage”. This was also emphasised in Mind Star Toys Inc v. Samsung Ltd citing Rio Algom 
                                                 
164 Also known as the kompetenz – kompetenz doctrine. 
 
165 See generally: Allan Scot Rau, ‘The arbitrability question itself’, (1999) 10 at 287; William W. Park, 
‘The arbitrability dicta in first options v. Kaplan: what sort of Kompetenz – Kompetenz has crossed the 
Atlantic?’(1996)12 at 137; William W. Park, ‘Determining arbitral jurisdiction: Allocation of tasks 
between courts and arbitrators’, (1997) 8 at 133. 
 
166 Earliest possible time is deemed to be not later than the filing the statement of the defence i.e. Article 21 
(3) Arbitration Rules. 
 
167 Article 16(3) of the Model Law. 
 
168 (1991) MP 2674 at Pg. 30 of the judgment. 
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Ltd v. Sammi Steel Co. 169 the court inter alia said that courts powers in matters of 
contractual interpretation such as these are limited in that they appear to have the role in 
determining matters of law and construction. Jurisdiction and scope of authority are for 
the arbitrators to decide in the first instance, subject to later recourse to setting aside the 
ruling or award. These authorities clearly point out who has the power to determine 
matters of jurisdiction as being the arbitrator himself and in case of displeasure resulting 
in an appeal, the court. The model law and the rules serve to enlighten the parties on 
what to do, when to do it and above all, where to do it on matters of jurisdiction.  
 
A further examination of the kompetenz – kompetenz doctrine was carried out by the U.S 
courts in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc 537 U.S 79 (2002) where an investor in a 
limited partnership commenced proceedings against her broker for misrepresenting an 
investment’s quality. The brokerage firm responded with a suit seeking an injunction 
against the arbitration because the investment advice was more than six years old and 
thus barred by the national association of securities dealers (NASD) eligibility rule170 
which functions as a statute of limitations for arbitration, but is imposed by the NASD 
rather than the state law. Unlike a statute of limitations that restricts a party’s right to 
bring a claim, the eligibility rule arguably limits an arbitrator’s jurisdiction to hear the 
dispute. Resolving a split among the circuits over who (judge or arbitrator) decides on 
eligibility requirements, the howsam court held that the time limits were for the arbitrator 
to determine. In the words of Mark W. Friedman, et al, ‘developments in international 
commercial dispute resolution in 2003’171 “the running theme through out the cases is 
that for each question whose arbitrability is in issue, the arbitrators had the authority to 
determine the limits of their power. Conclusively, such judicial restraint in interfering 
with arbitration procedure is generally considered good for arbitration.” Indeed, it has 
                                                 
169 (1991) 47 C.P.C (2nd) 251 (Ont. Gen. Div) at Pg. 256. 
 
170 NÄSD code of arbitration section 10304 (formerly R.15) states that no dispute “shall be eligible for 
submission to arbitration … where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the … 
dispute. 
 
171 38 int’l law 265. 
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been argued that the right balance as regards the courts powers ought to be struck if 
arbitration is to flourish.172 
 
3.2.5.2 Existence or Validity of an Arbitration Agreement 
 
This power is also at the first instance vested in the arbitrator or arbitration tribunal. This 
underlies the fact that a party can’t simply refuse to go to arbitration because he thinks 
the arbitration agreement is invalid or doesn’t exist. In instances where parties have gone 
to the extent of refusing to appoint arbitrators because they find no validity or basis in the 
agreement, the court has gone ahead to force them to do so as was in Pacific Int. Lines 
(pte) Ltd and Another v. Tsinlien Metals and Minerals Co. Ltd173 or even appoint them 
on behalf of the parties as seen in Oonc Lines Limited v. Sino – American Trade 
Advancement Co. Ltd174. The bottom line here is that, even if one thinks there is no valid 
arbitration agreement he is supposed to comply and then raise his grievances to the 
tribunal because he is only allowed in court if the tribunal overrules him. 
 
 
3.2.6 Validity of the Contract and Its Effect on the Arbitration Clause 
 
The model law and the arbitration rules have all concurred on the fact that ‘an arbitration 
clause which forms part of a contract and provides for arbitration shall be treated as an 
agreement independent of the other terms of the contract’.175 The rationale for this being 
that parties can still pursue arbitration or any other remedy for acts subsequent to the 
annulment of the parent contract. Article 16 (1) of the model law and article 21 (2) of the 
rules serve to say that a decision by a tribunal that the parent contract is null and void 
                                                 
172 The right balance ought to ensure that there is minimization of court interference and maximization of 
court support for the arbitral process. See: Derviard in a paper presented at an international conference in 
Johannesburg on Resolution of international trade and investment disputes in Africa on 6th – 7th March 
1997. In this light, the South African Law commission is of the view that the right balance has been struck 
in the model law. See Commission’s Report Para 2. 12; David Butler, ‘The South African Law 
Commission’s proposal for a New International Arbitration Act for South Africa to implement the 
UNCITRAL model law’ (1999) at 4. 
  
173 Published in English in 1992, Hong Kong law digest 5 excepts of the judgment can be found in 
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Journal, Part 4, December 1992, 240, [1993] 2 HKLR 249. 
 
174 In the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, High court Miscellaneous Proceedings No. 50/94. 
 
175 Article 16(1) Model Law and Article 21(2) Arbitration Rules respectively. 
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does not ‘ipso jure’ invalidate the arbitration clause. This summation has grown to be 
referred to as the doctrine of separability and has indeed been partially recognised in 
English law since the Heyman v. Darwing176 decision where its pointed out that the 
arbitration clause is separable from the contract containing it so that if the contract is 
repudiated or the repudiation is accepted the clause survives thus, enabling the arbitrator 
to render an award on the claim arising out of the alleged repudiation. Further more, 
Steyn, J (as he then was) in Harbour Assurance co (UK) v. Kansa General International 
Assurance Co Ltd and ors177 on the scope of the doctrine of separability enunciated / 
concluded that it was applicable to cases concerning the initial invalidity of the contract. 
However, in cases where illegality is raised to render the agreement containing the 
arbitration clause void ab initio he said: 
 
… While the distinction between invalidity and illegality isn’t one which in my 
view should prevail, I conclude that … the separability principle doesn’t extend 
to ab initio illegality of a contract in which arbitration is embedded.178 
 
The above cases were cited in contrast in Fang Sang Trading Co. ltd v. Kai Sun Sea179 
with the ultimate position being addressed in Enrique .C. Wellbers S.A.I.C.A.G v. 
Extraktions Technic Gesellschaft fur Anlagenbai M.B.M: s/m Ordinario where the court 
for instance rejected the plea for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed that the 
arbitration clause was autonomous and therefore, its validity did not depend on the 
validity of the parent contract, on the applicable law or on the court with international 
jurisdiction to resolve any dispute. The principle of autonomy of such a clause is 
internationally accepted and as such incorporated in article 16(1) of the model law. The 
court hastened to say that although the said article had not been adopted in Argentina, it 
                                                 
176 [1942] AC 356. 
 
177 [1993] 3 ALL ER 897 (English Court of Appeal). 
 
178 The court in this case seems to interpret and give legal meaning to article 8 (1) of the model law giving 
courts the power to out law arbitration if it finds the parent agreement null and void, inoperative and 
incapable of being performed. 
 
179 (1991) MP 2674 at Pg. 30 of the judgment. 
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reflects generally accepted principles in the matter and can be taken into account to make 
up for the absence of a specific national norm. 
 
Clearly, the spirit behind the above findings and analysed articles is not to lead the parties 
to the court room they sought to avoid in subjecting themselves to arbitration as the 
forum for addressing the matters arising out of the repudiation of the contract. The parties 
can still have room for non-adversarial discussion and settlement before an arbitrator or 
arbitral tribunal, which will however, have trimmed powers. This is a positive piece of 
legislation which makes arbitration more advantageous compared to litigation, where 
invalidity of the contract kills all the rights that accrue therefrom. Such a provision only 
serves to boost the confidence of the parties to engage in ADR and particularly 
arbitration, because they can still get something out of the dealing or redress for 
inconvenience accruing from the invalid contract at worst. 
 
3.2.7 Interim Measures 
 
This means measures taken before the conclusion of the arbitral process. These measures 
are mainly designed for the protection of any of the parties in relation to the subject 
matter. The arbitration tribunal is surely endowed with the power to grant them at the 
request of either party.180 The protection sought from the tribunal may include measures 
for the preservation of goods or commodities forming the subject matter of the dispute 
and the tribunal may indeed extend its authority to require the deposit of security for the 
costs of such measures.181 The essence of demanding security for costs as an interim 
measure is to guarantee adequate compensation in case inconvenience is suffered (to the 
party that suffers it) in relation to subject matter. In a way, one can relate these measures 
to the ones that are granted in civil proceedings aimed at preserving the status quo and in 
effect preventing the tampering with the subject matter with the aim of defeating the 
outcome of the case. 
 
                                                 
180 Article 26 rules and Article 17 of the model law. 
 
181 Article 26(2) rules and Article 17 of the model law. 
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It is important to note that the methods for obtaining such interim relief are dual i.e. can 
be obtained from the arbitral tribunal and / or from the courts of law as can be drawn 
from article 9 of the model law and article 26(3) of the arbitration rules. These provisions 
address the issue of compatibility of courts in awarding interim measures vis-à-vis the 
arbitration agreement and the proceedings, concluding that it’s not incompatible with the 
arbitration agreement for either party to seek interim protection from a judicial authority. 
The effect of this is to give parties the confidence that they will always be protected when 
the need arises. With the provision of two forums from where this protection may be 
sought a party is never constrained when the tribunal is not sitting. 
 
3.2.8 The Process 
 
As earlier seen, in the presence of an arbitration agreement or clause the process is 
commenced by an aggrieved party in a statement of claim which basically enlists the 
facts, issues of conflict, relief sought, law applicable and the appointment of an arbitrator 
(if under the arbitration agreement / clause he was under obligation so to do). The 
respondent then files a statement of defence to the claim. Of paramount importance here 
is, that amendments are allowed on either documents.182 This right is provided for parties 
who feel the need to clarify certain issues during the arbitration process or address the 
issue that would be of interest to the tribunal and had not been earlier tackled. The only 
limitation to this right being that it should be exercised in reasonable time and that the 
amendment of the claim does not fall out of the scope of the arbitration clause or separate 
arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal is empowered with the jurisdiction to rule on 
these limitations. 
 
With the above in place, then the arbitrator(s) may commence business assuming there 
are no objections or challenges raised. The tribunal will go on with the hearing by taking 
down the evidence from either party in support of their respective claims as the burden of 
                                                 
182 Article 20 rules and Article 23(2) of the Model Law. See also: Article 22 – 23 of the Arbitration Rules 
which provide for further written statements and the duration the tribunal can allow for the tendering of the 
same. 
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proof lies on all parties to prove their claims.183 Evidence depending on the agreement of 
the parties or ruling of the tribunal may either be viva voce or documentary. The 
flexibility of the UNCITRAL instruments is reflected in the fact that apart from the 
normal notice of date, time and place being given, each party is required to communicate 
to the tribunal and the opposite party fifteen days before the hearing the names and 
addresses of the witnesses, subject upon which and language in which they will testify. 
Another advantage of the process is that unless the parties agree otherwise all 
proceedings shall be conducted in camera.184 This is with the aim of maintaining the 
confidentiality. This flexibility allows a party to try his best to obtain a favourable yet fair 
decision without the rigidity of the substantive law procedures in courts while protecting 
his / her trade secrets and grievances from the public domain or know how. 
 
3.2.9 Experts 
 
For the purpose of getting a fair decision, the instruments allow for the calling of experts. 
The important aspect here is that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties the expert is 
appointed by the tribunal to give his opinion on specific issues that the tribunal may be 
confronted with.185 Upon so doing, once the expert has come up with a report it’s availed 
to all parties and in case of disgruntlement then he may be availed for examination on 
matters contained in his report at the request of the disgruntled party. The disgruntled 
party may also be permitted to call another expert to shed some light or give another 
opinion on the issue in dispute. This power endows the tribunal with extra knowledge on 
any issue that is novel to them hence, guiding them to making an informed decision. 
 
3.2.10 Neglect of Proceedings 
 
Like in a court trial, failure of a party to attend arbitration after submitting to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal without showing sufficient cause shall lead to the termination 
                                                 
183 Article 24 Arbitration Rules and Model Law. 
 
184 Article 25(3) and (4) Arbitration Rules. 
 
185 Article 27(1) Arbitration Rules and Article 26(1) (a) of the Model Law. 
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of the proceedings but with a decision in favour of the party that availed himself. Here, 
the tribunal makes it’s finding basing on the evidence before it.186 Adequate notice is a 
prerequisite before such a step is taken. It looks a little harsh but experience has grown to 
show that, it is not uncommon that one party has no interest in cooperating and 
expediting matters. The measure was designed to penalise any party who seeks to stifle 
the work of the tribunal with the sole aim of giving international commercial arbitration 
its necessary effectiveness, within the limits of fundamental requirements of procedural 
justice. 
 
After going through the above discussed procedure and making certain that neither party 
still has any evidence to adduce or submissions to make, the tribunal may close the 
hearing giving itself the necessary time to render an award.187 However, in bracing itself 
to render a decision, the tribunal is obliged under Article 28 of the model law to decide 
the dispute in accordance with the law the parties chose. A lot of significance can be 
drawn from this obligation; it gives the parties the mandate to choose the law that will 
govern the dispute.188 This latitude of freedom is very important because laws of various 
jurisdictions don’t fully address this, which leaves parties trapped in the frailties of 
national laws that tend to suffocate this right, hence, dampening the morale of the parties 
to arbitration. In addition, the reference to the choice of rules of law gives the parties a 
wide range of options regarding to the designation of the laws applicable to the substance 
of the dispute by for example agreeing to rules of law which have been elaborated by an 
international body, such as UNCITRAL in our case, but have not yet been incorporated 
into any national legal system.189  
 
                                                 
186 Article 25 Model Law and Article 28 Arbitration Rules. 
 
187 Article 29 Arbitration Rules. 
 
188 Butler op cit 3. 
 
189 Section 6 of the Explanatory note by UNCITRAL secretariat on the Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration. 
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The rendering of a final award then terminates the arbitration procedure and mandate of 
the tribunal unless subsequent recourse is sought in enforcement or legal challenge of the 
arbitral award. 
 
3.3 Conciliation 
 
In utilising this dispute resolution option, it should be noted that the UNCITRAL 
conciliation rules only apply if the parties specifically adopt them. The rules are designed 
for ad hoc proceedings, where no organisation specifically administers the case and 
where the parties along with the mediator/ conciliator determine the procedure to be 
followed. The UNCITRAL rules are very detailed and complex; however, the parties are 
at liberty to modify or exclude any rule by express agreement.190 
 
3.3.1 Conduct of Conciliation 
 
Conciliation191 commences with the consideration whether it is international or domestic, 
because the UNCITRAL rules were mainly designed for international disputes. Article 
1(1) of the model law on international commercial conciliation is clear on this point. 
However, the discretion to determine the scope of applicability is left to individual states. 
The test to distinguish international cases from domestic ones is given or established 
under article 1(4) where the internationality requirement will be fully met if the parties 
have their business premises in different states at the time they conclude the conciliation 
agreement or where a state where a substantial part of the obligation of the commercial 
relationship is to be performed or with which the subject matter of the dispute is almost 
closely connected differs from the state in which the parties have their places of business. 
 
                                                 
190 Julie Baker, ‘International mediation … a better alternative for resolution of commercial disputes: 
Guidelines for US negotiators involved in an international commercial mediation with the Mexicans’ 
(1996) 19 at Pg. 5. 
 
191 As already defined in Chapter Two. 
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The second consideration should always be examining whether there is an existing 
conciliation clause or agreement in case of a dispute. To this end, a model conciliation 
clause has been provided at the very end of the conciliation rules to wit: 
 
Where in the event of a dispute arising out of or relating to this contract, the 
parties wish to seek an amicable settlement of that dispute by conciliation, the 
conciliation shall take place in accordance with the UNCITRAL conciliation 
rules as at present in force. 
 
This clause is designed to provide guidance to parties who are desirous of avoiding 
problems in the event of disputes arising out of commercial contracts they may have 
concluded. Designing an appropriate dispute resolution clause is always prudent before 
relations are savoured by the misdeeds of either party. In this vein, C. Mark Baker192 
while presenting a paper at an arbitration and mediation conference in Austin, Texas 
cautioned thus: 
 
If I can leave you with one thought it would be to remind you what your 
grandmother probably told you: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
cure. Time spent at the beginning of a transaction considering the disputes that 
are likely to arise and then creating an appropriate dispute resolution procedure 
will greatly advance the business objective of resolving future disputes more 
quickly, economically and efficiently. 
 
The essence of having a good conciliation clause early enough could never be better 
emphasised. Upon establishing the existence of a conciliation clause then the aggrieved 
party is at liberty to initiate conciliation proceedings by sending out an invitation to the 
other party highlighting the subject of the dispute.193 This gives the invited party thirty 
days within which to reply because failure of which is construed as a rejection of the 
process. This invitation is also important in determining when the conciliation is deemed 
to have started, this normally, is when the parties to the dispute agree to engage in such 
proceedings. That is to say an agreement to do so upon invitation is of the essence. 
                                                 
192 C. Mark Baker, loc cit. 
 
193 Article 2(1) Conciliation Rules and Article 4 of the Model Law. 
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Further, the time limit of thirty days is intended to facilitate the faster resolution of 
disputes and curb the dilatory conduct of the parties who seek to delay the dispute 
resolution. This time ceiling being the general rule is subject to an exception of parties’ 
agreement to waive it. The waiver is solely intended to provide maximum flexibility and 
respect to the principle of party autonomy over the procedure to be followed in 
commencing the conciliation. The provision in issue however, has a weakness in that it 
omits to provide for what stands to happen in the event of non-compliance to the 
invitation unlike in arbitration where court is allowed to intervene by appointing an 
arbitrator on behalf of the defiant party.194 
 
However, if the other party honours the invitation then the parties appoint a conciliator.195 
This approach is viewed as respecting the consensual nature of conciliation and also 
providing parties greater control and therefore confidence in the process. It allows speedy 
commencement of conciliation and may foster settlement in the sense that party 
appointed conciliators, while acting independently and impartially, would be in better 
position to clarify the position of the parties and thereby enhance the likelihood of 
settlement.196 The appointed conciliator may conduct the conciliation in any manner he 
chooses, taking into account the circumstances of each case and parties’ instructions 
which may go as far as the mode of taking evidence – whether viva voce or by written 
statements – as long as it facilitates the settlement of the dispute.197 Though the 
conciliator chooses the modus operandi he must at all times ensure fair and equal 
treatment of the parties198 if the integrity of the process is to be maintained, as this is 
the ‘basic obligation and minimum standard to be observed by every conciliator.’199 
                                                 
194 This is because conciliation as dealt with in chapter two is a consensual mechanism under which a party 
can’t be punished for lack of interest. 
 
195 Article 4 rules and Article 5 model law. 
 
196 Guide to enactment and use of the UNCITRAL model law of international commercial conciliation, 
Para. 50. 
 
197 Article 7 rules and Article 6 model law; C. Baker, supra at pg. 26. 
 
198 Article 6(3) Model Law and Article 7(2) Conciliation Rules. 
 
199 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/57/17), Para. 57. 
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This requirement should not at any moment be misconstrued because ‘fair treatment’ per 
se is intended to govern the conduct of the process and not the contents of the settlement 
agreement.200 
 
Conciliators conducting the process may have both facilitative and evaluative roles. The 
rules require the conciliator to assist the parties in an independent and impartial manner 
in an attempt to reach an amicable resolution of the disputes. While so doing, “mediators 
also typically facilitate communication by clarifying issues and maintaining order during 
joint sessions. The mediator might [maintain] order the way a judge maintains order in a 
courtroom – by insisting that everyone communicates in a controlled and rationalised 
manner. More likely though, the mediator sees value in angry or emotional outbursts by 
one or more parties. The mediator may believe that the problem can’t be resolved without 
the parties venting.”201 If this means suggesting or making proposals for settlement then 
the conciliator is at liberty to do so though it is normally advisable for the conciliator to 
reserve his opinion until the parties have hit a deadlock. But even then the proposals 
should just be suggestions and not mandatory orders. Stephen Ware202 is alive to this 
point when he asserts thus: 
 
The problem-solving mediator encourages each party to generate many possible 
solutions before assessing any of them. The crucial point is to separate the 
inventive phase of generating possible solutions from the evaluative phase of 
assessing the merits of those possibilities. When it comes to time to assess 
possible solutions, the problem-solving mediator helps the parties judge them by 
how well they advance the interests of both parties. The mediator’s assessment 
of the proposals may lead to the mediator making proposals of her own. But the 
problem solving mediator typically prefers that proposals come from the parties 
to increase the parties’ sense of ownership and to allow the mediator to remain 
more objective. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
200 Guide, supra, Para. 60. 
 
201 Kimberlee K. Kovach, ‘Mediation: principles and practice’, (1994) Pg. 25. 
 
202 Stephen J. ware, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (2001) Pgs. 208 – 217. 
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In a bid to informatively advise the parties, the conciliator may request a party to submit 
a further statement of its position, facts and grounds in support thereof, which should also 
be served on the other party.203 This is to prevent an ambush on the other party as it helps 
him get better prepared and hence save the time spent in mediating the dispute, which is 
in the interest of both parties financially. 
 
Upon positive conclusion of the process, the primary responsibility for drafting of the 
settlement framework rests with the conciliator. Under Article 13 he is required to submit 
such settlement framework to the parties for their observation. On receiving their 
comments and observations the conciliator may amend the terms of the possible 
settlement and resubmit them to the parties. Where upon the parties reach an agreement 
on the settlement of the dispute, it’s their duty to draw up and sign the final settlement 
agreement, if desired with the conciliators assistance.204 The signing of which will 
effectively conclude the dispute and resolution process. 
 
3.3.2 Disclosure of Information 
 
There is a general presumption that any information disclosed by a party to a conciliator 
may be revealed to the other party or parties unless it is accompanied by a request for 
confidentiality.205 The notion of ‘information’ is intended to cover all information 
communicated by a party to a conciliator. The notion as used in the articles in issue 
should be understood as not only being limited to communications that occur during 
conciliation but also communication that takes place before the actual commencement of 
the conciliation.206 The intent of this is to foster open and frank communication of 
information between the parties and the conciliator and at the same time preserve the 
parties’ right to maintain confidentiality. This also helps build the confidence of the 
                                                 
203 Article 5 Conciliation Rules. 
 
204 Article 13 Conciliation Rules, see also: C Mark (supra). 
 
205 Article 10 Conciliation Rules and Article 8 Model Law. 
 
206 Guide, supra, Para 60. 
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parties in the system. The principle of disclosure however, is not absolute, as the 
conciliator has the freedom, but not the duty, to disclose such information to the other 
party as long as he thinks it will aid the speedy settlement of the dispute.207 On the whole 
disclosure of information has two aspects that go to the root of the process; 
confidentiality and admissibility of disclosed information. 
 
3.3.2.1 Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality is not only the bedrock but also the strength of conciliation and other 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms against adversarial judicial proceedings. 
Articles 9 and 14 of the model law and conciliation rules respectively were broadly 
drafted referring to ‘all information relating to conciliation proceedings’ to cover not only 
the information discussed during the conciliation proceedings, but also the substance and 
result of the proceedings, as well as matters relating to conciliation that occurred before 
the agreement to conciliate was reached, unless of course, the agreement to conciliate and 
its validity were in issue before a competent court of law. 
 
Under the principle of confidentiality, all mediation sessions are confidential. The parties 
may neither disclose nor testify as to the content of these sessions. This principle 
stretches and applies to any offers, admissions or proposals made throughout the 
mediation.208 The aim of such restrictions is to facilitate open and candid discussions 
between the parties as it reassures the parties that the information revealed in the 
mediation will not be used against them in later proceedings. This is because the success 
of mediation is largely dependent on open discussions. To this end the U.S court of 
appeals fourth circuit in Re Anonymous209 held thus: 
 
The assurance of confidentiality is essential to the integrity and success of the 
mediation program, in that confidentiality encourages candour, between parties 
                                                 
207 Guide, supra, Para 59. 
 
208 Tobi P. Dress, ‘International commercial mediation and conciliation.’ (1988) at 575. 
 
209 283 F.3d 627. 
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and on the part of the mediator, and confidentiality serves to protect the 
mediation program from being used as a discovery tool for creative attorneys. 
The circuit hastened to say: 
 
If participants can’t rely on confidential treatment of everything that transpires 
during [mediation] sessions then counsel of necessity will feel constrained to 
conduct themselves in [a] cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner more 
suitable to poker players in a high stakes game than to adversaries attempting to 
arrive to a just resolution of a civil dispute. The atmosphere if allowed to exist 
would destroy the effectiveness of the program, which has led to settlement and 
withdrawal of some appeals and to simplification of issues in other appeals…210 
 
The need to enhance confidentiality is the sole reason as to why no notes are allowed to 
leave the mediation/ conciliation venue. Since this duty always binds the ‘parties’, a 
question has always prevailed as to whom the term refers to. The confidentiality rule in 
light of this question has been interpreted as not being limited in its application to the 
formal parties of the mediated dispute, but to all participants in mediation, including 
attendants of the mediation conference.211 In the same vein, conciliators or mediators 
cannot be summoned to testify in subsequent proceeding as regards the conciliation. To 
this the court was of the view212 that: 
 
If mediators were permitted or required to testify about their activities, or if the 
production of notes or reports of their activities could be required, not even the 
strictest adherence to purely factual matters would prevent evidence from 
favouring or seeming to favour one side or the other. The inevitable result would 
be that the usefulness of the [mediation program] in settlement of future disputes 
would be seriously impaired, if not destroyed. 
 
                                                 
210 Ibid. 
 
211 U.S. court of appeals fourth circuit. Rule 33, 28 U.S. CA. 
 
212 In re anonymous, loc cit. 
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Actually, the conciliator is required to make this clear right from the onset. He must warn 
the parties that any such attempt to have him testify about the contents of the conciliation 
will be vigorously fought at their cost. 
 
However, like any other rule, the confidentiality rule is subject to exceptions to wit; 
where such disclosure is required by the law, such as an obligation to disclose evidence 
of the commission of a criminal offence, or where disclosure is required for purposes of 
implementation or enforcement of the settlement agreement and if it is in public interest 
for example, to alert the public about a health or environmental safety risk.213 The test in 
examining as to whether to waive the confidentiality rule is one of ‘manifest injustice’ 
which requires the party seeking the disclosure to demonstrate that the harm that will be 
caused by nondisclosure will be manifestly greater than the harm caused by the 
disclosure.214 
 
3.3.2.2 Admissibility of Evidence in Subsequent Proceedings 
 
This is the second limb connected by the thread of disclosure of information. Articles 10 
and 20 of the model law and rules cater it for respectively. This limb basically bars the 
introduction and subsequent admissibility of any information procured from conciliation 
in subsequent proceedings, whether arbitral or judicial. This is to avoid conciliation being 
used as a fishing expedition by canny lawyers. The prohibition covers views regarding 
proposals for possible settlement, admissions or indications of a party’s willingness to 
settle, invitation to take part in conciliation or fact that a party was willing to take part in 
conciliation, proposals made by conciliator or documents prepared solely for conciliatory 
purposes. The reason behind this prohibition is to avoid the possibility of a ‘spill over’ of 
information, which might discourage the parties from trying to reach a settlement during 
conciliation proceedings and hence reduce the usefulness of conciliation.215 The articles 
                                                 
213 Guide supra, Para 63 and A/CN.9/514, Para 60. 
 
214 U.S. Court of Appeal Fourth circuit, supra. 
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impose dual obligations in terms of admissibility of evidence in subsequent proceedings: 
an obligation upon the parties not to rely on the types of evidence specified therein and an 
obligation to the courts to treat such evidence as inadmissible in the unlikely event of its 
introduction.216 The only exception to this bar is if that information is required under the 
law or for the purposes of implementation or enforcement of a settlement agreement. 
 
It should however be noted that, any other information generated for other purposes than 
conciliation although presented at conciliation does not cease to be admissible i.e. all 
other information that would otherwise be admissible as evidence in a subsequent court 
or arbitral tribunal does not become inadmissible solely by reason of it having been 
presented in an earlier conciliation.217 
 
3.3.3 Termination of Conciliation Proceedings 
 
It is clear that conciliation is founded on the principle of party autonomy, where by 
parties determine their own fate. In this vein, both the model law218 and conciliation 
rules219 provide guidelines on how and when conciliation proceedings are terminated 
which are: by conclusion of a settlement agreement by the parties, on the date of the 
agreement.220 In this aspect, the term ‘conclusion’ is used in the model law instead of 
‘signing’ used in the Conciliation Rules to better reflect the possibility of entering into a 
settlement agreement in any form other than a signed document, such as by exchange of 
electronic communications or even orally. This was enacted bearing in mind that 
flexibility is the greatest advantage of conciliation. 
 
                                                 
216 Official records of the General Assembly, fifty-seventh session, supplement no. 17 (A/57/17), Para 166. 
 
217 Article 10(5) Model Law. See also: Guide: Para 73. 
 
218 Article 11. 
 
219 Article 15. 
 
220 Article 11 (a) Model Law and Article 15 (a) Conciliation Rules. 
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The conciliator can also terminate the proceedings upon consultation with the parties and 
realising that further efforts at conciliation are no longer justified.221 A party can also 
declare to the conciliator that the proceedings are terminated222 or by a party declaring to 
the other.223 
 
In all termination procedures enumerated above it should be noted that less emphasis is 
placed on formality. The gist being that, parties should not have to go through a hassle to 
get out of a process they entered voluntarily. 
 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
 
It is worth mentioning that the UNCITRAL model laws and rules (herein after referred to 
as ‘UNCITRAL works’) represent a culmination of several years of effort by experienced 
arbitral experts from many countries.224 The existence of the UNCITRAL works has 
certainly accrued several advantages to international trade on the whole and alternative 
dispute resolution in particular. These advantages are: 
o Coming with the acceptability of several countries with differing legal, social and 
economic backgrounds. Acceptability has also been enhanced by their being 
floated or presented by the United Nations in several major languages.  
o Providing international uniformity and therefore not being a subject to parochial 
nationalistic labels, which was the sole reason for the creation of UNCITRAL and 
the particular working group. 
                                                 
221 Article 11 (b) Model Law and Article 15 (b) Conciliation Rules. 
 
222 Article 11 (c) Model Law and Article 15 (c) Conciliation Rules. 
 
223 Article 11 (d) Model Law and Article 15 (d) Conciliation Rules. 
 
224 More than 50 states of all regions and legal and economic systems as well as more than 15 international 
organisations participated in the preparatory work. The delegations included many internationally known 
arbitration experts. Small wonder that the discussions, as reflected in the travaux preparatoires and 
acknowledged by commentators, were of remarkably high quality. See: RH Christie, ‘The UNCITRAL 
model law and the powers of the courts: A South African perspective’ (1999) at 3; Gerald Aksen, ‘The Iran 
– U.S claims tribunal and the UNCITRAL arbitration rules – an early comment.’ (1982) at 1.  
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o Being easily referred to in contracts without necessarily the need for lengthy 
negotiations over procedural wrangles. To ensure this, model clauses have been 
included in the respective works. 
o Lastly, their existence assures parties of the best possible procedures for ad hoc 
arbitration or conciliation without administering agencies, if this is desired. While 
at the same time they are flexible enough to permit accommodation to 
institutional aid either as appointing authority or for complete administrative 
services or with minor modifications they may be adopted as institutional rules.225 
 
Conclusively, all that can be safely said now is that the UNCITRAL works provide a 
valuable framework to aid both government negotiators and private individuals 
responsible for clean and easy resolution of disputes. The existence of internationally 
acceptable instruments to aid international alternative dispute resolution can not be 
overstated as it serves to address the phobia that has always impeded international trade – 
cultural biases embedded in national legislations. The existence of these instruments has 
paved way for nations to slither towards uniformity in the bid to have one economic 
world. 
 
 
                                                 
225 An example can be drawn from the inter-American commercial arbitration commission. See Gerald 
Aksen, op cit 2. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 Arbitral and Conciliation Awards and Their Enforcement In Light Of the 
UNCITRAL Instruments 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As already seen in the previous chapters, one of the ways by which proceedings are 
terminated (whether conciliatory or arbitral) is by the rendering of an award. In 
conciliatory proceedings the parties reaching a settlement of the dispute can effect 
termination. This chapter therefore, seeks to examine what happens once those 
settlements or awards are rendered. The examination will be mainly based on the 
UNCITRAL model laws and rules on both arbitration and conciliation plus the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (herein 
after referred to as the New York Convention).226 
 
4.2 Conciliation 
 
Upon successful completion of conciliation, parties may choose to verbally agree on a 
settlement.227 This however, has evidentiary problems in case the other party fails to live 
up to his bargain. The other problem with oral settlements is that since conciliation is a 
consensual process, they are not binding upon the parties. In this light, it is always 
advisable for parties to enter into or conclude written settlement agreements.228 The 
model law is silent on this but the conciliation rules provide thus:229 
 
If the parties reach an agreement on the settlement of the dispute, they draw 
up and sign a written agreement … 
                                                 
226 Although the United Nations prepared the Convention prior to the existence of UNCITRAL, promotion 
of the Convention is an integral part of the Commission's programme of work. As its name indicates, it 
provides for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in foreign countries. See: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html. 
227 Mark Baker, (1997) op cit 37. 
 
228 Ibid. 
 
229 Article 13(2) Conciliation Rules. 
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It is the duty of the parties as stated above to draw up the settlement agreement. However, 
where they find any difficulty the same provision allows them to seek the guidance of the 
conciliator. This is an exhibition of the authority that the parties have upon their 
proceedings. Being a consensual process, the parties are given the chance to design their 
destiny, enshrining it in a settlement agreement which goes a long way in cementing 
rather than breaking their relationship, be it commercial or otherwise. By having the 
agreement reduced to writing the parties avoid evidentiary problems and also impose 
legal obligations on one another to live to their bargain. Actually in this vein Article 
13(3) of the conciliation rules hastens to say: 
 
The parties by signing the settlement agreement put an end to the dispute and 
are bound by the agreement 
 
The effect of this provision is that in case one of the parties falters on this agreement or 
doesn’t fulfil his obligation then the other can have a foundation upon which to seek 
redress through any other procedure that may be available to him, judicial or 
otherwise.230 As a precaution however, parties are advised to include a dispute resolution 
clause to address any dispute that may arise from the settlement agreement.231 
 
4.2.1 Enforcement of Conciliation Settlement Agreements 
 
The issue of enforcement becomes crucial when one of the parties fails to satisfy his 
obligations under the settlement agreement. It should be noted that only settlement 
agreements that are reduced into writing and signed by the parties are enforceable. This is 
because the settlement agreement gives birth to contractual obligations for both parties, 
which give either party rights that are enforceable in the eyes of the law.232 Despite the 
parties having a right to enforce settlement agreements that accrue from the conciliation 
process, a problem lies in the fact that there is no ultimate procedure to be followed in 
                                                 
230 Mark Baker, ‘The corporate representative and ADR’, (1997) 37. See also: Baker & Arif op cit 29. 
 
231 Ibid. 
 
232 Article 13(3) Conciliation Rules; Article 14 of the Model Law. Mark Baker loc cit; Baker & Arif loc cit. 
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doing so. Though the aim of conciliation is expedited resolution of disputes, when it has 
come to enforcement the matter has been dependent on the technicalities of domestic 
procedural laws, which do not easily lend themselves to harmonisation by way of 
uniform legislation.233 
 
The contractual nature of the settlement agreements in many states is still a novel aspect 
of the process to the extent that some nations today don’t have special provisions on the 
enforceability of such settlements, with the result being that they would be enforceable as 
any contract between the parties.234 In a nutshell, the process of enforcement of 
settlement agreements has been left to domestic authorities that have dealt with it in 
various ways around the world. Some states such as Hungary,235 Korea236 and China237 
have provided for the appointment of a sole arbitrator for the sole purpose of rendering an 
arbitral award on the contents of the settlement agreement. In other jurisdictions such as 
Australia, the status of the agreement reached following conciliation depends on whether 
or not the conciliation took place in a court system and the legal proceedings in relation 
to the dispute are on foot.238 This consideration is bad for the flexibility of the 
conciliation regime because it handicaps the parties who wish to avoid the courts of law. 
In Uganda for example: the principal requirements are that the settlement agreement is 
drawn up and signed239 by the parties with the conciliator authenticating it too and 
                                                 
233 Guide to Enactment and Use of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Conciliation, 2002, Para 88. 
 
234 A/CN.9/514, Para 78. 
 
235 In Hungary, section 39 of Act LXXI, of 8 November 1994 provides that: 
(c) An award agreed shall have the same effect as that of any award made by the arbitral tribunal. 
 
236 In the Republic of Korea, the arbitration law does not contain provisions on conciliation but conciliation 
or mediation is practiced widely (see the Korean arbitration rules of the Korean commercial arbitration 
board, as amended on 14 December 1993). Article 18 (3) provides that, if conciliation succeeds, the 
conciliator shall be considered as the arbitrator appointed under the agreement of the parties and the 
settlement reached shall be treated as an award on agreed terms. 
 
237 Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China, article 51. 
 
238 A/CN.9/514, PARA. 79. 
 
239 Section 58(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2000, Cap 4, Laws of Uganda. 
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furnishing a copy to each of the parties.240 Upon so doing, the settlement agreement shall 
have the same status and effect as if it was an arbitral award.241 The status and effect 
leaves one wondering whether the international conciliation settlement agreements are 
given the same treatment as international arbitral awards and thus enforced under the 
New York Convention. 
 
Conclusively, therefore, one may rightly say that there is no recognised uniform 
procedure for the enforcement of conciliation settlement agreements. This is a weakness, 
which only serves to open the floodgates for court battles any time enforcement is sought. 
This sort of uncertainty is not good for the process because it erodes the confidence of the 
businessperson who wants to use this form of ADR. 
 
4.3 Arbitration 
 
Arbitration on the other hand, has a clearer regime when it comes to recognition and 
enforcement of the decisions that accrue there from. From the onset, it should be noted 
that decisions that result from arbitration are embodied in arbitral awards. The arbitral 
award is rendered by the majority of arbitrators or if it’s a question of procedure, where 
there is no majority or when the arbitral tribunal so authorises the presiding arbitrator 
may exercise this jurisdiction subject to revision, if any by the arbitral panel.242 
 
4.3.1 Form and Content of an Arbitral Award 
 
An arbitral award like a judgment of a court of law shall be in writing243 and signed by 
the arbitrator(s) rendering it.244 In a process that involves more than one arbitrator the 
                                                 
240 Section 58(6) op cit. 
 
241 Section 59 op cit. 
 
242 Article 31(1) and (2) of the Arbitration Rules. 
 
243 Article 32(2) of the Arbitration Rules and article 31(1) of the Model Law. It is almost a universal 
requirement in international commercial arbitration that the award be written and signed. The New York 
Convention implies in its Article IV that the award must be in writing, but does not say so explicitly. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law states it explicitly in Article 31. See: UNCTAD, ‘Dispute settlement: International 
commercial arbitration’2005 at pg. 24.  
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signatures of the majority shall suffice, on condition however, that reason is given for the 
omitted signatures.245 The award shall contain the ratio decidendi i.e. reason for the 
decision unless the parties agreed otherwise.246 This requirement is aimed at showing the 
parties where they went wrong to avoid any future wrongdoing. Generally, an award 
serves to record the terms of an amicable settlement by the parties.247 Importantly though, 
neither the model law nor rules require or prohibit dissenting opinions although it is the 
majority that counts. As a requirement, the arbitral award must be dated248 and must also 
state the place where the arbitration took place.249 This requirement plays three 
significant roles throughout the arbitration; in that it determines the law governing the 
arbitration and courts empowered to act in support thereof, or to interfere with, the 
arbitration. Similarly, stating the place of arbitration on the award confirms the court 
before which the losing party can move to have the award set aside. It also establishes 
whether enforcement of the award can be sought under the New York Convention.250 
 
Upon successful rendering of the award each party must be availed with a copy of such 
award.251 This is mostly for evidentiary purposes in the event of a party defaulting on his 
obligation and the other party wants to have recourse in other proceedings. These copies 
have educational value for businesspersons and institutions in that they guide them in 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
244 Article 32(4) of the Arbitration Rules and article 31(1) of the Model Law. 
 
245 Ibid. 
 
246 Article 32(3) of the Arbitration Rules and article 31(2) of the Model Law.  
 
247 No arbitration law or rules set forth the style or extent of the reasons that must be given in the award. 
What is needed is sufficient explanation for the parties to understand the process by which the arbitral 
tribunal reached its decision. See: UNCTAD op cit 27. 
 
248 The date determines when the award has res judicata effect and can be executed by a court. An example 
can be drawn from France’s New Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1478. It is also important because it 
helps in calculating the period within which the losing party can move to have the award set aside in light 
of Article 34 (3) of the Model Law, though in some cases the time limit may be said to begin when the 
award is received. 
 
249 Article 32(4) of the Arbitration Rules and article 31(3) of the Model Law. 
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avoiding a similar problem in future. This does not however, give the arbitrators the 
authority to publish the award. Making the award public depends on the laws of the 
country but this step should always be taken with the consent of the parties.252 This 
consent is jealously guarded by the courts of law because such publication goes to the 
root of the confidentiality of the process. 
 
4.3.2 Interpretation and Correction of the Award 
 
These duties entirely lie with the arbitrator(s). Interpretation on one hand is with notice 
on the other party requested with in 30 days of receipt of the award.253 This is to avoid 
uncertainty and to obtain further explanation of the award so as to facilitate the 
understanding of the obligations that accrue there from.254 The courts have no place in the 
exercise of this power because the pronouncement of the arbitrators is final and binding. 
This interpretation once requested, should be given within 45 days and upon so doing, it 
forms part of the award. The reason for the time limits here is to facilitate the expeditious 
resolution of disputes and work against frivolous delays in meeting of obligations by 
canny parties. 
 
A party on the other hand requests correction within 30 days and with notice to the other 
party. This doesn’t apply to the effect of altering the award but to errors in computation, 
clerical and typographical errors. The major difference here lies in the fact that unlike 
interpretation which has to be sought by either party the court can act on its own volition 
in matters of correction. This however, must be done in the availed time to reduce the 
endless process. 
 
                                                 
252 Article 35 of the Arbitration Rules. 
 
253 Domenico di Pietro and Martin Platte, ‘Enforcement of international arbitral awards: The New York 
convention of 1958’, 2001 at 22. 
 
254 The interpretation should be of the award, not the reasoning. The arbitral tribunal must be careful not to 
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Where all the above is done then it’s the duty of the parties to comply and satisfy the 
obligations imposed on to them by the award. In the event of failure, the party has a right 
under the New York Convention to apply for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral 
award. 
 
4.4 Recognition versus Enforcement 
 
These are two different processes with potentially different outcomes. They may actually 
be regarded as two different stages of parties’ set of rights and obligations. Recognition 
on one hand, relates to acknowledgement of a status quo as ruled in an award by an 
arbitral panel.255 A party follows this course of action in order to make the award or 
outcome of the arbitral process known, which serves to alter the legal relationship 
between the parties in light of the rights that accrue from the award.256 The situation may 
remain this way in case the parties comply with their obligations. Recognition comes 
with no enforcement privileges but sets the ground for exercise of such rights at a later 
stage. This mere recognition of the arbitrators’ decision is the province of enforcement in 
case the loosing party defaults on his obligation. 
 
Enforcement on the other hand, is aimed at altering the position of the parties to reflect 
the decision taken by the tribunal257 by for example seizure of the defaulter’s property or 
garnisheeing his bank accounts. The bottom line here is that recognition and enforcement 
are complimentary processes. Recognition is a condition precedent for enforcement of an 
award, which can’t be practically achieved without the former.  
 
 
 
                                                 
255 This is an area not covered by the South African Act 40/77 as it only contains provisions relating to 
enforcement yet in its short title its clear that the Act was to cover both recognition and enforcement. See: 
South African Law Commission, ‘Arbitration: A draft international arbitration Act for South Africa’, 
Discussion paper 69, Project 94 Para 3.12. 
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4.5 Application of the New York Convention 
 
Article 1 sets the maximum standard for the application of the convention to any arbitral 
award. It lays down the condition precedent for the conventions applicability. In this 
sense, it states that the award sought to be recognised and enforced must have been 
rendered in the territory of a state other than where it is sought to be recognised and 
enforced.258 It must be a product of differences between persons, whether physical or 
legal and the award in issue must not be considered domestic in the state where such 
enforcement is sought.259 From this text we note that the criteria normally adopted in 
national conflict of law rules such as nationality of parties, place where assets are located 
or lex loci contractus have no place.260 The essential yardstick in the provision is the state 
where the award was made. This all points to the flexibility of the arbitration procedure 
because knowing that different states have various ways in which they resolve conflict of 
laws scenarios the New York Convention goes for a simple yet effective standard. This 
seemingly simple determination may encounter problems where the award is signed in a 
place other than the seat of arbitration. Such problems may open doors for the national 
courts for purposes of interpretation, which will call for enormous expenditure in terms of 
time and finances. The controversy that may ensue was exemplified in Hiscox v. 
Outhwaite261 where the House of Lords held that an award signed in Paris despite being 
rendered in an arbitration located in England was to be considered as made in Paris for 
purposes of the convention.262 This is a loophole, which needs to be addressed. The 
residual criterion is further extended in the last part of the provision, which calls for 
applicability to awards ‘not considered as domestic’, but it doesn’t state the 
                                                 
258 Booysen op cit 387. 
 
259 Ibid. 
 
260 Domenico op cit 23. 
 
261 [1991] 3 ALL ER 641; 1991 3 W.L.R 297. 
 
262 The House of Lords in this case further held that in the context, the word “made” should be given its 
ordinary, natural and common construction. It went further to say that, the award is simply a written 
instrument, which is made when, and where it is perfected and it is perfected when it is signed. The award 
was therefore made in Paris making it a convention award. 
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characteristics to be taken into account in order to differentiate between a domestic and 
foreign award.263 
 
Conclusively on this point, though the premise of the process is its flexibility, as earlier 
noted, the determination of the requirement stands to be left at the discretion of the harsh 
national courts. 
 
4.5.1 Reservations 
 
The convention in order to be so widely accepted264 needed to give states the latitude of 
choosing who to cooperate with and what type of awards they would enforce. Hence, the 
reservations found in article 1(3); reciprocity and commercial reservations.265 
 
4.5.1.1 Reciprocity Reservation 
 
This reservation was adopted to cater for parties that did not believe in the principle of 
“universality” which would have permitted the enforcement of arbitral awards 
irrespective of their source. The effect of this reservation is to allow nations the latitude 
to only enforce awards that emanate from fellow contracting parties.266 This waves a red 
flag for international businesspersons to be aware of the status of the arbitration seat they 
choose. 
 
4.5.1.2 Commercial Reservation 
This reservation allows nations the right to reserve the application of the convention to 
awards resulting from a legal relationship considered commercial in nature. This 
                                                 
263 Examples of such characteristics are highlighted in Sigval Bergesen v. Joseph Muller AG, U.S. ct App. 
2nd cir 17 June 1983, 548 F supp. 650 (1982) 38 Arb. J. 70 (1983) to include nationality of the parties, 
applicable law, contract subject matter or in case of property disputes, the location of that property. 
 
264 To date the New York Convention has 137 signatories to its name. See:  
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.Accessed on 01st 
September 2005. 
 
265 South Africa acceded to the New York Convention with effect from 1st august 1976 without reservation. 
See: Hansard 18th March 1977 col 3834; South African Law Commission op cit 60. 
 
266 This counts for the large number of signatories because they feel their sovereignty is being respected. 
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reservation explains the reason for the existence of what constitutes ‘commercial 
disputes’ in the model laws on both conciliation and arbitration. Indeed, disputes have 
arisen as to what constitutes a commercial relationship; an example can be drawn from 
the High Court of India which held the rendering consultancy services by a company for 
promoting a related commercial deal should not be regarded as a commercial nature. This 
interpretation was contested in the Supreme Court, which held thus:267 
 
While construing the expression commercial it has to be borne in mind that 
the aim of the convention is to facilitate international trade by means of 
facilitating suitable alternative ways of settlement of international disputes 
and therefore any expression adopted in the convention should receive 
consistent with its literal and grammatical sense a liberal construction. The 
expression commercial should therefore be construed broadly having regard to 
manifold activities, which are integral part of international trade nowadays. 
 
This reservation was also extensively examined in Societe d Investissement Kal v. Taieb 
Haddad Barret268 where a dispute was between a company that had retained two 
architects to draw up urbanisation plans for a resort in Tunisia. The contract contained an 
arbitration clause for all disputes under the ICC in Paris. A dispute arose in relation to 
professional fees and the ICC rendered an award in favour of the two architects who 
attempted to enforce it in Tunisia. Both the court of first instance and the court of appeal 
denied the enforcement. On appeal the Supreme Court held that: 
 
Tunisia made the commercial reservation when adhering to the convention. 
Thus, it will apply the convention only with respect to disputes which are 
commercial under Tunisian law. The contract from which the dispute arises is 
one concerning architectural plans drawn by architects, which do not fall 
within the definition of articles 1 – 4 of the commercial code; [the contract] is 
not by its nature commercial under Tunisian law. Since the contract between 
the parties is [not commercial], the convention does not apply to it and the 
arbitral clause cannot be contained there in according to article I (3) of the 
said convention. The parties have submitted the contract to Tunisian law …. 
                                                 
267 RM Investments &Trading Co. pvt Ltd v. Boeing Co. Supreme Court Journal, 1994 vol. 1 pgs 657 – 664. 
 
268Cour de cassation [Supreme Court], 10 November 1993; see also year book XXIII (1998) pgs 770 - 773 
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According to article 258 CCCP, arbitration clauses are allowed only for 
disputes concerning a commercial relationship. This contract is not 
commercial and does not concern a commercial relationship, thus it does not 
fall within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, independent of its 
being international or not, since the international aspect is linked to the 
commercial nature: the two co-exist and if one is absent the other looses its 
second essential component. Hence, the referral to arbitration is not allowed; 
this conclusion is drawn from articles 277 and 318 CCCP. 
 
From the two cited authorities it is eminent that commerciality has been given a very 
narrow meaning leaving the courts with the discretion to interpret it. It is submitted that 
the only logical remedy would be to broaden the meaning of the word “commerce” to 
cater for the continuing evolution of new features of commercial relationships.269As 
rightly pointed out by Domenico Di Pietro and Martin Platte270 such a test may be too 
broad and inadequate in certain specific matters but may still retain its validity given the 
attitudes of national jurisdictions271 towards matters characterised by the element of 
internationality and yet retain the flexibility of the arbitration process. 
 
4.6 Recognition and Enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement 
 
An obligation is placed on all contracting parties to recognise any arbitration agreement 
that is in writing.272 The effect of this requirement being that where a court is seized with 
a matter which is subject to an arbitration agreement in any member state it must stay 
proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration. The writing requirement in the provision 
serves two purposes; to provide evidence of mutual intent to submit to arbitration as well 
as the contents of the arbitration agreement and to exert some higher form of “warning” 
                                                 
269 To include items that go to the professional status of the parties such as: banking, insurance, supply of 
services such as energy, communication of information, carriage of goods by any means of transport etc. 
 
270 Domenico, op cit 61. 
 
271 Because the final decision as to what qualifies as commercial is for the law of the country where 
enforcement is sought. 
 
272 Article II (1) of the New York Convention. South Africa lacks such a provision in its law. See: South 
African Law Commission op cit 61. 
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or notice that the parties are excluding national courts and there by waiving their 
constitutional right to have their cases heard in before a state court.273 The second 
paragraph to the provision sheds more light on what constitutes an agreement in writing; 
an arbitration clause or submission agreement signed by the parties or contained in the 
exchange of letters or telegrams.274 In essence the, written agreements are broadened to 
include exchanges of either letters or telegrams or the modern day e- mails. The effect of 
all this being that it’s not the actual signature that is required but expression of intent in 
writing.275 The decisive criterion here is whether the parties are aware that they are 
entering into an arbitration agreement. The bottom line therefore, is if the acceptance 
notice is in writing, or if a duplicate of the offer or acknowledgement of the order is 
returned, the arbitration clause meets the writing requirement. Upon finding in the 
affirmative the court is bound to recognise and enforce the agreement by referring the 
parties to arbitration.276 This is what has been referred to as ‘compelling arbitration’.277 
The court must also be convinced that the dispute arises from a defined legal relationship. 
Simply stating that all future disputes will be referred to arbitration alone is not sufficient. 
The agreement in issue must refer to a specific (defined) legal relationship, which most 
commonly is a contract.278 The test of the thumb was laid down in Astro vencedor 
Compania Naviera SA of Panama v. Mabanaft GMBH (“The Dominos”)279 to the effect 
that if a claim or issue has sufficiently close connection with the claim under the contract 
                                                 
273 Yearbook XI (1986) at 532; yearbook XIII (1988) at 446; ICC award 5832 (1988). 
 
274 This matter was considered in Sphere Drake Insurance PLC v. Marine Towing Inc, cited in year book 
XX (1995) Pg. 937 which was followed by the Swiss supreme court in Compagnie de Navigation et 
Transport SA v. MSC (Mediterranean Shipping Co) year book XXI (1996) Pg. 697 holding that “according 
to the formal requirements applicable in casu, arbitration agreements are valid which are contained in a 
signed contract or in an exchange of letters, telegrams, telexes and other means of communication. In other 
words a distinction should be made between agreements resulting from a document which must be in 
principle signed, and an agreement resulting from an exchange of written declarations, which are not 
necessarily signed”. 
 
275 See: court of appeals decision in DIETF v. RF AG (5 July 1994) year book XXI (1996) Pgs. 685 – 686. 
 
276 Article II (3) of the Convention. 
 
277 John P. Bowman, ‘Compelling Arbitration in International Cases’ (2003) at 14. 
 
278 Domenic Di Pietro supra, at Pg. 90. 
 
279 [1971] 2 QB 588, [1971] 2 ALL ER 1301. 
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it has to be referred to arbitration. This requirement however, goes to the construction of 
the arbitration agreement and clause, which demands that there must be a nexus between 
the contract and the resultant dispute.280 
 
The last requirement is that the matter must be capable of settlement by arbitration. This 
requirement varies depending on the jurisdiction as it entirely rests on the national public 
policy. This requirement however, has caused a problem where nations have used it to 
kill actions that are brought by foreigners who try to infiltrate their markets for specific 
products while restricting others. An example can be drawn from the United States on 
anti trust matters. With the Sherman’s Anti Trust Act the U.S prohibits contracts, 
combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce.281 In this Act, it is 
declared that any person who monopolises or attempts to monopolise trade or commerce, 
shall be guilty of an offence. As a matter of public policy, in the U.S. any dispute that 
arose from a contract that contravened the anti- trust laws was not arbitrable until 1985. It 
was at this time that the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc282 rejected the arguments raised in an earlier case283 to hold in a 5: 3 
decision that anti trust claims are arbitrable in the international context: 
 
The Bremen and Sherk establish a strong presumption in favour of the 
enforcement of freely negotiated contractual choice of forum provision … 
thus we must weigh the concerns of the American safety against a strong 
                                                 
280 See decision in Concourse Village, Inc v. Local 32 F, Service Employees International Union, 882 F.2nd 
302, 304 (2d cir. 1987) where it was held that “indeed unless it can be said with positive assurance that the 
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute, the dispute should 
be referred to arbitration”. 
 
281 The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, passed in 1890, was the first important federal measure to limit the power 
of companies that controlled a high percentage of market share.  
See: http://projects.vassar.edu/1896/trusts.html accessed on 20th Sep. 2005. It has also been argued 
elsewhere that the Sherman Act was never intended to protect competition. It was a blatantly protectionist 
act designed to shield smaller and less efficient businesses from their larger competitors. See: Thomas J. 
DiLorenzo, ‘The Origins of Antitrust: Rhetoric vs. Reality’, published in The Cato Review of Business & 
Government, accessible on line at: http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv13n3/reg13n3-dilorenzo.html 
accessed on 20th Sep. 2005. 
 
282 473 U.S. 614; 105 S.Ct. 3346; 87 Led. 2d 444 (1988). 
 
283 American Safety Equipment Corp. v. Maguire (J.P) & co 391 F.2d 821 (2d) cir (1968). 
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belief in efficacy of arbitral procedure for resolution of international 
commercial disputes and equal commitment to enforcement of freely 
negotiated choice of forum clauses … accordingly we require this 
representative of the American business community to honour its bargain … 
by holding this agreement to arbitrate enforceable.284 
 
Such an example shows the uncertainty surrounding what qualifies as public policy. It is 
however, advisable that parties while negotiating international contracts take into 
consideration such matters, which can give birth to a lot of inconvenience or result in 
leaving them with awards that they simply cannot enforce. 
 
4.7 Recognition of Arbitral Awards 
 
Contracting states of the New York Convention are duty bound under article III to 
recognise arbitral awards and enforce them in accordance with their laws of procedure.285 
Of course, this is subject to any reservation that might have been made by the state where 
the award is sought to be recognised and subsequently enforced. In this vein, the article 
prohibits the imposition of substantially onerous conditions or fees or charges on the said 
duty than are imposed on the recognition and enforcement of domestic awards. To avoid 
controversy, article IV lays down what ought to be submitted by a party applying for 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award to wit; a duly authenticated original 
award or duly certified copy thereof,286 an original arbitration agreement referred to in 
article II of the convention or a certified copy of the same287 and a translation of the said 
                                                 
284 The Bremen v. Zapata case 407 U.S. 1; 92 S.Ct 1907; 32 L. ED. 2d 513(1972) referred to in the cited 
quotation of the judgment simply highlighted that the American business cant delve into international 
waters on their own terms, governed by their laws and having their disputes resolved in American courts 
reminding the Americans of the international trend of uniformity in the enforcement of arbitral awards, 
citing the principle of comity. 
 
285 South Africa however, in S.2 (1) of Act 40/77 which is intended to give effect to article III provides that 
‘[a]ny foreign arbitral award may subject to the provisions of section 3 and 4, be made an order of court’. 
(Emphasis added). The language used in the provision is discretionary, permissive and not mandatory 
which is contrary to the intention of the convention (where instead of ‘may’ the provision uses ‘shall’) 
which was intended to bind every signatory to it. This therefore, is a weak link which ought to be addressed 
in order to satisfy South Africa’s international obligations. 
 
286 Article IV (1) (a). 
 
287 Article IV (1) (b). 
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documents if they are not in the language of the country where the award is relied 
upon.288 The convention in article IV serves to make the formal conditions for 
enforcement as simple as possible and it supersedes any municipal law. The applying 
party by furnishing the said documents is held to have produced prima facie evidence 
entitling him to obtain enforcement of the award. The burden is now cast on the resisting 
party to prove that enforcement should be denied. Of paramount importance is the fact 
that, the said documents should be supplied with the application and not at a later stage. 
However, this is not a very rigid requirement and should not be read literally which has 
resulted in a number of courts allowing the applicant to cure the non- (timely) - fulfilment 
of article IV.289 However, regardless of the standard set in article III some countries have 
contrary to their international obligation gone ahead to impose onerous conditions. In 
South Africa for example onerous conditions can be found in section 1 of the Protection 
of Business Act 99 of 1978 (PBA) which is to the effect that: 
 
“No judgment or arbitral award made outside south Africa shall be enforced 
inside south Africa without the consent of the minister of trade and industry, if 
the judgment or award arose from an act or transaction ‘connected with mining, 
production, importation, exportation, refinement, possession, use or sale of or 
ownership to any matter or material, of whatever nature, whether within, 
outside, into or from south Africa” (Emphasis Added) 
 
As can be seen from above, this is a legislative huddle, which can only be circumvented 
with the minister’s consent if the arbitral award results from a transaction connected to 
mining, production, importation, exportation, refinement, possession, use or sale of 
ownership of “any matter or material” into or from the Republic. This requirement has 
proved to be so cumbersome because it virtually includes everything a businessperson 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
288 Article IV (1) (2) which requires the translation to be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a 
diplomatic or consular agent. 
 
289 See: year book I (1976) Pg. 182 (Australian supreme court decision of 17th November 1965) and the 
U.S. supreme court decision in Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch Foster Corporation, year book II 
(1977) Pg. 252. 
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can engage into.290 The fate of any businessperson seeking enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award, like foreign judgments, in South Africa is determined by the minister of 
economic affairs. Without any set requirements for such approval, great uncertainty 
looms as regards the minister’s consent and the chances of its being successfully 
challenged,291 which is not good for business. As earlier alluded to, the section is very 
broad and covers almost the entire business arena literally forcing the businessperson 
who obtains a foreign arbitral award to apply for ministerial consent before attempting to 
enforce it. This requirement is ridiculous in the face of international commercial 
arbitration in that it serves to complicate and prolong the process, which ought to be 
short. In so doing, it increases the financial implications and thus is burdensome on the 
party seeking enforcement in South Africa. The provision in issue has been interpreted to 
be mandatory and actually applies notwithstanding any other law or legal provision to the 
contrary.292 
 
4.7.1 Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Award 
 
Where an application for recognition and subsequent enforcement is made, the court is 
endowed with authority to deny this right on application of the opposing party if he 
furnishes it with proof that satisfies articles V and VI of the convention. The provisions 
clearly show that it is only the opposing party who can invoke this right. In essence, the 
court cannot at its own volition seek to investigate whether the grounds for refusal have 
been met. The court can only act on its own volition in circumstances laid down in article 
V (2).293 It is not mandatory however, that upon satisfaction of the conditions exemplified 
                                                 
290 See: Chinatex Oriental co. v. Erskine 1998 (4) SA 1087 (c) and Tradex Ocean Transportation SA v. MV 
Silvergate (or Astyanax) and others 1994 (4) SA 119 (D) where the expression “any matter or material” was 
in issue with the latter case settling for the position that it means raw materials. 
 
291 Hartzenber J in Seton v. Silveroak Industries Ltd 2000 (2) SA 215 at 226 (e). 
 
292 See: Forsyth C F, ‘Private International Law’ 3 ed 1996 at Pg.402 who is keen to point out that the 
section was designed to protect South African businesses ‘from the far reaching tentacles of American anti-
trust legislation’; SA law commission, ‘Arbitration: A draft arbitration Act for South Africa’ discussion 
paper 69, Para 3.78. 
 
293 Article V (2) concerns the enforcing court and the law of the enforcing jurisdiction. It provides court 
with a ‘safety net’, in order to give courts a tool of not enforcing awards that violate basic notions of its 
own jurisdiction such as those against public policy. 
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in article V (1) enforcement should be denied. The language used (“may refuse”) is 
permissive rather than mandatory which therefore allows room for courts discretion in the 
matter as detailed in China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Cpn v. Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd294 
where the Hong Kong Supreme Court said that: 
 
Even if a ground of opposition is proved there is still a residual discretion left 
in the enforcing court to enforce non-the less. This shows that the grounds of 
opposition are not to be inflexibly applied. The residual discretion enables the 
enforcing court to achieve a just result in all circumstances… 
 
This is sought to be in line with the flexibility that lies in arbitration. The gist being that if 
flexibility is found in the conduct of arbitration then it should also lie in the enforcement. 
Further still, the court is armed with the authority to measure whether its resultant order is 
likely to manifest grave injustice on the parties. This discretion therefore is a calling to 
reason. 
4.8 Grounds for Refusal 
 
The grounds upon which recognition and refusal can be denied as enshrined in the said 
provisions are here below examined. 
4.8.1 Incapacity 
 
Though most contracts are always affected by incapacity in the sense of irregular 
procedure, the New York Convention chooses to tackle the substantial aspect of 
incapacity in light of the arbitration agreement. This comes into issue where one party is 
a state, public body or national agency whose disputes are not allowed for referral to 
arbitration unless formal permission is obtained. This limitation is always embodied in 
the domestic law of the party in issue. This problem may be rare and not often 
encountered but a debate has always arisen whenever it comes up. An example can be 
drawn from Fougerolle SA v. Ministry of Defence of the Syrian Arab Republic295 where 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
294 Yearbook XX (1995) Pg. 671. 
 
295 Yearbook 1990 Pg. 515. 
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the Syrian government availed its self this defence yet the contract had been duly 
approved under Syrian law. Arguments by the French company that the Syrian law 
breached the convention as to impossibility for contracting states to adopt stricter 
requirements for enforcement of awards and the Syrian law being superseded by their 
accession to the convention were rejected. The court found that the violated rules of the 
Syrian law were mandatory and pertaining to public policy and hence, the application for 
enforcement was dismissed.296 However, the demands of the modern day commerce were 
considered by the Italian Supreme Court, which laid down an advanced position in the 
judicial attempt to solve the dilemma caused by state bodies in international commercial 
arbitration stating thus: 
 
We consider that, under the law applicable to international commerce, which 
necessarily governs the arbitration clause in the present case, legal persons of 
public law may, unless the parties have explicitly agreed otherwise, 
undoubtedly agree to arbitration independent of domestic prohibitions by 
expressing their consent and sharing the international market place, the 
conditions common to all operators297 
 
This case goes further to state that the burden of proof lies with the party alleging the 
ground impeding enforcement. This trend should be upheld in all jurisdictions if 
international arbitration is to maintain its reputation as independent from all local 
inferences. 
 
4.8.2 Invalidity of the Arbitration Agreement 
 
The relevant standard to determine such invalidity lies not in article II but rather in the 
law that the parties choose to govern their arbitration agreement and the law of the place 
                                                 
296 See also: Southern Pacific Properties ltd v. The Arab Republic of Egypt & the Egyptian General Co. for 
Tourism and Hotels 1. L.M 752 (1983) where a ministers signature to an arbitration agreement was found to 
merely be approval of worthiness of the agreement, as required by Egyptian law, and not as the intention to 
be bound by the agreement. 
 
297 Corte di cassazione (Italian supreme court) 9 May 1996 No. 4342 reforming corte di appello (court of 
appeal) di bari 2 November 1993, No. 811. 
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where the award was made.298 To choose where the appropriate standard lies, we have to 
know whether the arbitration agreement is comprised in a parent contract or in an entirely 
separate agreement. If the situation were the former, then the arbitration clause would be 
judged under the law chosen by the parties. If however, it’s a separate arbitration 
agreement all together, for which a separate choice of law has been made, then the most 
appropriate law will be where the arbitration took place. This has resulted from the test 
posed by the doctrine of separability which argues that an arbitration agreement is a 
contract separate from the main agreement and can be governed by a different law all 
together.299 This test however, only survives if the only invalidity in issue is that of the 
parent contract. The question on the law applicable to the agreement was resolved in a 
more convincing way by lord Mustill in Channel Tunnel Group ltd. V. Balfour Beatty 
constructions ltd300 where he said: 
 
Certainly there might at times be an express choice of a curial law which is 
not the law of the place where the arbitration is to be held:  but in the absence 
of an explicit choice of this kind, or at least some very strong pointer in the 
agreement to show that such choice was intended, the inference that when the 
parties contracted to arbitrate in a particular place consented to having the 
arbitral process governed by the law of that place is irresistible. 
 
Clearly the above assertion recognises the rights of the parties without imposing 
unrealistic conditions. In the words of Domineco et al301 it seems safe to assume that the 
choice of a particular law to govern the agreement is such a pointer to the parties’ 
intention. 
 
                                                 
298 Domenico op cit 143. 
 
299 Prima Paint Co. v Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Corp., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 
300 [1993] AC 334. 
 
301 Domenico op cit 148. 
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4.8.3 Where the Opposing Party Was Not Notified of the Proceedings 
 
This is normally referred to as lack of due process. This requirement is grounded in the 
Latin maxim ‘alti audi pateram’ (hear the other party) that is aimed to ensure a minimum 
standard of fairness during the process if justice is to be achieved. The process, firstly, 
refers to the right of the parties to be given adequate notice of the commencement of the 
arbitral process to enable them participate in the constituting of the arbitral panel. 
Secondly, the notion deals with a further right of the parties to play an active role in the 
arbitral proceedings. By so doing a party is given a chance to present his case, which is a 
kingpin in the notions of natural justice the violation of which invalidates any process. 
This requirement was well enunciated in Sesostris v. Transportes Navales302 where a U.S. 
court relying on article V (1) (b) declined to enforce an award rendered in Spain because 
the party against whom it was sought to be enforced only received notice on completion 
of the process. The parties however, have found a way of circumventing this requirement 
by ensuring that service is indeed done but with in a very short time spell between that 
date of service and the day slated for the commencement of the process. Most challenges 
have been moulded around this mainly because there is no formal requirement for the 
time of service save for the fact that it must be reasonable to enable the other party 
participate in the proceedings and present is case. This was the crux in Generica Limited 
v. Pharmaceuticals Basis Inc303 where it was said that: 
 
As the second circuit has noted that defence basically corresponds to the due 
process defence that a party was not given the opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner … therefore an arbitration 
should be denied or vacated if a party challenging the award proves that he 
was not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard as our due process 
jurisprudence defines it … it is clear that an arbitrator must provide a 
fundamentally fair hearing … a fundamentally fair hearing is one that meets 
the minimal requirements of fairness – adequate notice, a hearing on the 
evidence, and an impartial decision by the arbitrator. 
                                                 
302 727 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass. 1989). 
 
303 U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 29 September 1997. No. 96 – 4004. 
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Nonetheless the parties should not expect the formalities of court procedure to apply 
because the arbitrator enjoys wide latitude in conducting an arbitration hearing. Yet 
arbitral proceedings are not constrained by formal rules or procedure of evidence; the 
arbitrator’s role is to resolve disputes, based on his consideration of all relevant evidence, 
once the parties to the dispute have had full opportunity to present their case.304 
Conclusively on this point, the parties affected by this requirement should raise it to the 
tribunal as soon as it happens and if it is rejected, only then will the party be heard on this 
issue in the court where enforcement is sought. 
 
4.8.4 Arbitrators Exceeding Given Authority 
 
This as can be read from article V (1)(c) results from the dual actions of the arbitrators: 
where they entertained a claim which the parties didn’t want referred to arbitration or are 
believed to have ruled on a matter beyond their scope of authority. Instances where 
arbitrators entertain matters which the parties didn’t refer to arbitration are referred to as 
‘extra petita’ claims simply because where as the tribunal has performed its duty, it has 
done so outside the mandate granted to it by the parties. The test in such circumstances is 
whether the tribunal in acting outside the scope of authority found colourable justification 
for their decision. This minimum standard was set in Andros Compania Maritima v. 
Marc Rich & Co. 305 where it was stated: 
 
When arbitrators explain their conclusions … in terms that offer even a barely 
colourable justification for the outcome reached, confirmation of the award 
can’t be prevented by litigants who merely argue, however persuasively, for a 
different result 
 
                                                 
304 Hoteles Condado Beach, 763 F.2d at 38. 
 
305 579 F.2d 691 [1978]. 
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So the point to be proved for such a defence to succeed is that the arbitrators delved into 
matters not subject to arbitration, relied on them in reaching their decision and as a result 
came to an irrational decision.306 
 
The other branch of this defence is when the arbitrators have ruled on a case beyond the 
scope of authority granted to them by the parties. This is referred to as “ultra petita” 
where though starting with in the limits given by the parties they have exceeded these 
limits. This limb however is not more of a problem because the convention attempts to 
resolve it by allowing courts to extract the part that is within their scope of authority and 
allow its enforcement.307 
 
4.8.5 The Composition of the Tribunal Was Contrary To the Agreement or the Law 
of the Country Where the Arbitration Took Place 
 
While considering this defence it should be noted that it is coated to emphasise party 
autonomy, which is the bedrock of all ADR procedures. It should be noted that unlike in 
the Geneva Convention, under the New York Convention, the parties only consult the 
law of the place where the arbitration took place in the absence of an explicit agreement. 
This defence on its own is difficult to rely on unless it is backed by other defences under 
article V (1). This is because the minimum standard set for the arbitration process 
requires equal and fair treatment of the parties and above all affording each party a 
chance to present its case. These are the basic grounds on which enforcement will be 
denied as drawn from China Nanhai oil joint service cpn v. Gee Tai holdings co. ltd308 
where the supreme court of Hong Kong rejected this defence when raised premised on 
the appointment of arbitrators on the Shenzhen list contrary to an earlier agreement to 
appoint arbitrators on the Beijing list. This was basically because the disputing party had 
not initially disputed the jurisdiction of the panel and therefore was estopped from doing 
it so late in the day. 
                                                 
306 Parsons &Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc v.Societe Generale del Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) 508 F.2d 
969 (2d cir. 1974). 
 
307 Article V (1) (c) of the New York Convention, 1958. 
 
308 Yearbook XX (1995) Pg 671. 
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In the same light, where parties agree on a given procedure and it is followed 
enforcement may be denied on grounds of violating mandatory provisions of the country 
of origin. 
 
4.8.6 Where the Award Has Not Yet Become Binding on the Parties 
 
An award has been found binding for purposes of the New York Convention if it is no 
longer open to an appeal on the merits, be it to an arbitral tribunal or a competent 
court.309 This depends on both the law of where the arbitration took place and the 
agreement of the parties. If the agreement by the parties provides for finality of the award 
without any further appeal then, so it will be. But if the agreement allows an appeal and 
the same has been lodged, then the award will not be binding until the appeal has been 
disposed off. It has been argued elsewhere that there being some formalities to be 
satisfied does not render the award unenforceable for not being binding.310 ‘Binding’ in 
this sense is decided depending on the procedural requirements embedded in the 
arbitration agreement and not domestically imposed unconventional steps. Nonetheless, it 
has been found reasonable to stay proceedings where the opposing party has applied to 
have the award set aside.311 Importantly however, it should be noted that the filing of an 
application to set aside the award in the country where it originated, is alone no automatic 
basis under article V (1) (e) to refuse enforcement. In such a case, it is only reasonable 
that the party is granted a stay under article VI and asked to deposit security for the 
fulfilment of the award.312 
 
4.8.7 Where a Competent Authority Has Set Aside the Award  
 
This defence is availed to parties by article V (1) (e). However, the use of the word ‘may’ 
denotes that it’s not mandatory but discretionary. There is no yardstick in deciding 
whether or not to grant or refuse enforcement when faced with this defence. As long as 
                                                 
309 See: Redfern / Hunter, ‘Law and practice of international commercial arbitration’, (1999) 3rd Ed, sweet 
& Maxwell, Pg. 468. 
 
310 See: Fertilizer Corpn of India (FCI) v. IDI Management Inc, yearbook VII (1982) Pg. 382 et seq. 
 
311 Ibid. 
312 939 F. supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). 
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the court is of the view that enforcement would be proper then it is at liberty to grant it 
most especially if the setting aside is based on a local law or regulation, which would not 
affect the award in the country, where it is sought to be enforced. This position was well 
illustrated in Chromalloy Aero services Inc v. Arab Republic of Egypt313 where an arbitral 
award that had been rendered in Egypt and later set aside there was found to be 
enforceable in the United States. The basis of such controversy is the permissive 
language used in the relevant article and article VII which out laws deprivation of more 
favourable provisions under the law of the country where such enforcement is sought. 
The cushion provided in article VII paves way for more domestic and yet arbitration 
friendly statutes which would otherwise have no place if the award was strictly a 
convention award.314 The provision therefore permits the enforcement of the award on 
another basis even if the conditions of the New York Convention are not met. Indeed, it 
has been argued elsewhere315 that, the party seeking enforcement is not deprived of more 
favourable recognition or enforcement procedures under national law of the state where 
enforcement is sought. So basically, in light of the issue, articles V and VII are 
complimentary to one another with the latter opening a wider door to ensure enforcement 
is not denied because of domestic frailties, which a party may not necessarily know 
about. However in exercising this power the courts ought to be extra careful lest they 
stand to destroy international comity, which is responsible for the thriving of 
international commercial arbitration. Frivolous exercise of this discretion has its own 
problems; it can be treated as disrespect of the courts of the jurisdiction where the award 
was set aside,316 can lead to inconsistent judgments317 and above all can result in a 
multiplicity of proceedings where a party who successfully had the award set aside will 
                                                 
313 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 
314 See also: Hilmarton Ltd v. OTV, Year book XX (1995) Pg. 663 where an award set aside in Switzerland 
was enforced in France with strength drawn from article VII backed by article 1502 of the French code of 
civil procedure which omits setting aside by a country where the awards was rendered as a ground for 
resisting enforcement. 
 
315 Van den Berg AJ, ‘The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958’, (1981) 154 at Pg. 243. See also: SA 
law commission, ‘Arbitration: A draft arbitration Act for South Africa’ discussion paper 69, Para. 3.71. 
 
316 Domenico op cit 174. 
 
317 Ibid. 
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have to initiate fresh proceedings to prevent the award from being enforced. This kills the 
flexibility and uniformity being sought for arbitration. Let alone the financial strain on 
the innocent party. 
 
4.8.8 Where the Subject Matter of the Dispute Is Not Arbitrable In the Country 
Where Enforcement Is Sought 
 
This brings in the issue of arbitrability. Undoubtedly, under article V (2) (a) the law 
based on to determine this arbitrability is the law of the state where the enforcement is 
sought. This provision however, is more suitable for domestic arbitrations rather than 
international ones where local national laws should be of less importance.318 
 
4.8.9 Where the Award Is Contrary To Public Policy 
 
This as earlier discussed depends on the domestic laws of the country where enforcement 
is sought simply because public policy differs depending on jurisdiction. There can be no 
proper definition for public policy but an example can be found in disputes that have their 
genesis in anti – competition contracts, which will find it hard to be enforced in the 
United States as earlier alluded to.  This defence has always worked to the detriment of 
the victorious party, which contracted without knowing the domestic practices of its 
opposite number. In such a case, this party will struggle and obtain a favourable award 
but remain empty handed if the opposite number does not have any assets outside the 
jurisdiction where enforcement of such award would be contrary to public policy. An 
example can be drawn from Soleimany v. Soleimany319 where it was held that an English 
court will not recognise an international award where the award was based on an illegal 
contract. The court refused to recognise the award as it would be contrary to public policy 
in England to enforce an illegal contract.320 The main aim of the convention in providing 
this defence is to safeguard the basic morals and legal principles of the state where the 
                                                 
318 The issue of arbitrability has already been discussed. See: 473 U.S. 614; 105 S. ct. 3346; 87 Led. 2d 444 
(1968). 
 
319 [1999] 3 ALL ER 847 (CA). 
 
320 Seton Co v. Silveroak Industries Ltd 2000 (2) SA 215 at 229. 
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enforcement is sought. This seems clear but ironically it is the parties that suffer due to 
the uncertainty of this defence because it is virtually impossible to know what violates 
public policy in the whole word. Even where fraud is alleged it has been interpreted in 
South Africa321 and elsewhere322 that unless it is clear on the face of the award or the 
arbitration agreement that the award is contrary to public policy then enforcement will 
not be denied. If however, extraneous evidence is necessary, as in the case of fraud, the 
respondents remedy lies in the jurisdiction of the court where the award was made. This 
is where an application to set aside the award should be made.323  
 
The South African provision in the PBA (as earlier discussed) as Forsyth argues can also 
be construed as restatement of public policy aimed at protecting South African businesses 
from the large amounts of punitive damages awarded by most notoriously United States 
(U.S.) courts which if so would be ably dealt with by the South African courts under 
section 4 (1) (a) (ii). This proposition was exemplified in Jones v. Krok324 where court 
held that the mere fact that an award of damages is made on a basis not recognised by 
South African law does not necessarily make the award contrary to public policy. 
Reiterating the position that although the principle behind the award of punitive damages 
is not necessarily unconscionable, the award of double the amount claimed as punitive 
damages because of the defendant’s reprehensible conduct was too excessive and 
exorbitant as to render it contrary to South African public policy. In so finding, the court 
showed its capability of handling matters of U.S. excessive damages on the public policy 
front hence watering down the need of having such a provision on South African law 
books. The provision of such statutory shields risks the danger of being viewed as over 
protection of South African businessmen from their liability, which goes against the 
fairness, sought by the convention. There is no basis for the retention of the provision 
given the fact that where the enforcement of an award is thought to be really unfair it can 
                                                 
321 Hartzenberg J op cit 230 (d) – (g) 
 
322 Interdesco v. Nullifire Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 190. 
 
323 Hartzenberg Loc cit. 
 
324 1996 2 SA 71 (T). 
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be refused on the courts discretion.325 In response to the criticism, the South African Law 
Commission has proposed new legislation to remedy the defects enshrined in Act 40/ 77. 
It is dismaying, however, that despite most problems being pointed out by the South 
African law commission they have never been attended to nine years down the road. The 
said Act 40 of 1977 undermines the principle behind the enactment of the New York 
Convention – to ease the rigours of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards through 
uniformity. It also undermines the courts’ authority in view of s.233 of the constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa considering the fact that they are supposed to prefer 
interpretation to any legislation in a manner that is consistent with international law over 
any other alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
In a nutshell, from the above examination of the enforcement procedure we note that the 
New York Convention has been the greatest architect of uniformity in the arbitral 
process. This is because though arbitration laws differ depending on the jurisdiction the 
enforcement mechanism is similar or almost similar all over the world. This has been 
aided by the fact that the New York Convention is the most ratified business 
convention326 which has resulted in most countries fine tuning their domestic laws to fit 
the standard set by it hence, resulting in uniform procedure and predictability which are 
key parts in the international business revolution. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
325 As can be read from the language of article V of the NYC and replicated in the use of the word “may” 
in section 4 (1) of the South African Act. See: The language used (“may refuse”) is permissive rather than 
mandatory which therefore allows room for courts discretion in the matter as detailed in China Nanhai Oil 
Joint Service Cpn v. Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd, cited in Year book XX (1995) pg. 671where the Hong Kong 
Supreme Court said that “even if a ground of opposition is proved there is still a residual discretion left in 
the enforcing court to enforce non-the less. This shows that the grounds of opposition are not to be 
inflexibly applied. The residual discretion enables the enforcing court to achieve a just result in all 
circumstances…” 
 
326 137 states have ratified it as of the 15th September 2005. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
International commercial arbitration and conciliation practices are developing new ways 
of conducting proceedings in this era where globalisation is opening cross-cultural 
trading and thus, creating more sophisticated problems and disputes. Presently, both 
dispute resolution mechanisms are under going a process of harmonisation in their basic 
notions through limitless combinations of their different elements in order to achieve a 
pleasing effect. The driving force behind the harmonisation has been UNCITRAL 
through its international commercial arbitration and conciliation-working group, which 
has drafted and introduced numerous instruments intended for cross cultural dispute 
resolution around the world. Through the particular working group, UNCITRAL has 
graced the business world with more acceptable and yet neutral instruments to ensure that 
a customer gains confidence in the process and also to engineer the law reform in many 
countries which have sought to identify with a model yet widely accepted trend of world 
trade and business dispute resolution at large. The provision of the model laws in several 
languages has served to bridge the gap that would have been created by a one 
‘languaged’ legislation.327 
 
The study has also revealed that as the rules of at least the major ADR institutions have 
become very similar, more ad hoc institutions refer to, or borrow from, the UNCITRAL 
model laws and rules, the common growing experience of arbitration and conciliation 
internationally stands to contribute towards a further greater harmonisation.  
 
Further still, the examination of the UNCITRAL instruments on international commercial 
arbitration and conciliation has revealed that UNCITRAL clearly envisioned the potential 
conflict eating up different legal traditions and attempted to provide a “culturally – 
neutral” procedural regime that is flexible enough to make parties to a dispute relatively 
                                                 
327 The model laws have been provided in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish and English. See: 
http://www.eisil.org/index.php?sid=297648529&id=1046&t=link_details&cat=488 accessed on 09th 
October 2005. 
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comfortable by eliminating the sharp edges of both procedural and substantive styles. As 
a result of which, the UNCITRAL instruments as exemplified by the hefty case law 
examined, have gained even wider acceptance as model procedure codes for conducting 
international ADR’s and thus, contributed to the harmonisation of both international 
commercial conciliation and arbitration legislations in general. 
 
The study has also revealed that despite the hard work of UNCITRAL some nations that 
have purported to domesticate the model laws and convention such as South Africa have 
still imposed onerous conditions mostly in the enforcement procedure. This is 
exemplified in the use of permissive rather than mandatory language, restrictions on 
currency in which payment can be made and above all the restrictive provisions of the 
PBA. This does not help UNCITRAL’s cause but instead stifles it due to national 
protectionist prejudices. 
 
This work has also highlighted the pivotal role played by the uniform enforcement 
procedure. By taking up the New York Convention, UNCITRAL signalled its unified 
move towards globalisation on the business front. By so doing, UNCITRAL through the 
working group unlocked the mystery that surrounded the obtaining and enforcement of 
remedies that accrue from international commercial disputes. By fronting international 
instruments (the New York Convention inclusive), UNCITRAL through the international 
commercial arbitration and conciliation-working group, has played its role in liberalising 
and strengthening international trade by beginning the journey to slither the dispute 
resolution mechanisms towards uniformity. Clearly, what remains is for all states to adopt 
the model laws and bless them with the good will from all executive arms to make them 
work. 
 
With such tremendous progress through the adoption of UNCITRAL instruments, it is 
just a matter of time before the world, even in the smallest African nation realises, 
appreciates and applauds the good work of the UNCITRAL working group on 
international commercial arbitration and conciliation in slithering the international 
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business community towards uniformity. Indeed, in this increasingly globalized world, it 
is the international, not national approach, that eventually stands to win. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
 
Despite the tremendous progress made by the UNCITRAL secretariat and instruments, a 
lot remains to be done if the desired harmonisation and uniformity is to materialise. In 
this light, the following recommendations are made: 
 
Regardless of their choice of rules, the parties should always specifically indicate their 
preference for ADR dispute resolution mechanisms in contracts before any disputes arise, 
in order to simplify and stream line the dispute resolution. 
 
UNCITRAL should also step in to prevent the ‘judicialisation’ of ADR methods lest they 
stand to loose the flexibility and liberalism which worked as an attractive web for 
international businesspersons who sought less adversarial methods to resolve their 
disputes. In this light, it is recommended that procedural and legislative technicalities be 
limited so as the processes can remain as simple and accommodative as UNCITRAL 
wishes them to be. 
 
Further still, a more systematic approach or regime when it comes to the enforcement of 
international conciliation settlement agreements in the mould of the New York 
Convention for arbitral awards should be considered by UNCITRAL. Currently, nations 
have been left to set the standard and procedure for the enforcement of the settlement 
agreements reached by parties to a dispute hence, the culmination to various standards 
and procedures. This trend does no favours to the UNCITRAL quest of achieving 
uniformity and harmonisation in the field or ADR and thus requires urgent attention. 
 
Ideally, preparation of legal texts such as model laws is strongly complemented by 
training, dissemination of information and technical assistance. Such developments 
benefit developing countries and other countries whose economic systems are in 
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transition. It is submitted therefore, that the aforesaid be increased to raise awareness 
both in states where the model laws have been or are not yet adopted with the sole 
purpose of provoking curiosity as regards the good that lies in the adoption of the model 
laws and using ADR methods under them. 
 
States that have already adhered to UNCITRAL Conventions and Model Laws should 
consider joining efforts to promote their acceptance and implementation by other states 
with which they maintain close business and trade relations. By so doing, states will 
enhance the benefits of legal certainty and predictability that the trading parties already 
derive from their countries’ participation in those instruments. 
 
The parties also need to be encouraged by court to embark on ADR if the facts are 
suitable. This is because the value and importance of ADR has been established in a 
remarkably short time. Indeed, all members of the legal profession who conduct litigation 
should now routinely consider with their clients whether their disputes are suitable for 
ADR. The courts in trying to advice the parties to delve into ADR methods should not 
however, forget that their duty is not to compel but to encourage as was stressed by 
Justice Dyson in Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS trust.328 
 
Further, as international trade has expanded in recent decades, so has the use of 
international arbitration to resolve disputes arising in the course of that trade. The 
controversies that international arbitral institutions have been called upon to resolve have 
increased in diversity and complexity and yet the potential of those tribunals for efficient 
dispositions has not yet been tested. If they are to take a central place in the international 
legal order, national courts will need to shake off the judicial hostility towards arbitration 
and also their customary and understandable unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim 
arising under domestic law to a foreign and trans-national tribunals. To this extent, it will 
be necessary for national courts to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the 
international policy favouring commercial arbitration.  
Word Count: 26,208 (excluding footnotes) 
                                                 
328 [2004] C.P. Rep 34. 
 
 
 
 
 96
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOKS 
o Albert Jan Van Den Berg, ‘The New York convention of 1958’ (Kluwer 1981). 
o C.W Moore, ‘The mediation process’ 2nd edition 1996. 
o David, ‘Arbitration in international trade,’ Deventer (1985). 
o Domenico di Pietro and Martin Platte, ‘Enforcement of international arbitral 
awards: The New York convention of 1958’, 2001, Cameron may ltd. 
o Hanold, ‘Uniform laws for international sales under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention’, Deventer (1987). 
o Hercules Booysen, ‘International transactions and the international law merchant’ 
(1995) Interlegal, Pretoria. 
o  Jan C. Schultsz and Albert Jan Van Den Berg (eds) Art of arbitration, 1982 
(Deventer: Kluwer). 
o Kimberlee K. Kovach, ‘Mediation: principles and practice’, (1994), 3d American 
Casebook Series 
o Mauro Rubino – Sammartano, ‘International Arbitration Law,’ 1990. Kluwer Law 
and Taxation Publishers. 
o Redfern / Hunter, ‘Law and practice of international commercial arbitration’, 
(1999) 3rd Ed, sweet & Maxwell. 
o Stephen J. ware, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (2001), St. Paul, MN: West 
Group. (Hornbook Series) 
o Terence Brake et al, ‘Doing business internationally: The guide to cross cultural 
success’, (1995). 
o Thomas Pricen, ‘Intermediaries in international conflicts’ (1992), Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
o Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 
o Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, ‘Dealing in virtue: international commercial 
arbitration and the construction of a transnational legal order’ (1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 97
CONTRIBUTIONS / ARTICLES 
o Abbass Alkhafazi, ‘what a small world after all’, in 1 international research in 
business disciplines—the dilemma of globalization: emerging strategic concerns 
in international business 5, 6 (Carl. L. Swanson ed., 1993). 
o Abraham Ribicoff, ‘Alternatives to litigation: The application to international 
disputes’, Arb. J., Dec. 1983 at Pg.3. 
o Agnes Wilson, ‘Drafting dispute resolution clauses – A practical guide’ 13 PLI/ 
NY 19 (1998). 
o Allan Scot Rau, ‘The arbitrability question itself ‘, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB 287 
(1999). 
o Andrew B Derman, ‘A primer on oil and gas host government contracts’, 46 oil & 
gas law & tax. 7.06[5] (1995). 
o Arif Hyder Ali, ‘information Technology Disputes – arbitration and mediation as 
alternatives to court litigation’ A paper presented at the arbitration and mediation 
conference, May 11 – 12, Austin, Texas. (Unpublished). 
o Bernard A Ramundo, ‘Power and Law in international negotiation: The 
negotiators perspective’, 17 Willamette L. Rev. 83, 84 (1980). 
o Bobette Wolski, ‘Recent developments in international commercial dispute 
resolution: expanding the options’, available online at: 
http://www.bond.edu.au/law/blr/vol13-2/Wolski.doc 
o C. Mark Baker and Arif Hyder Ali, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: A cross 
comparison of institutional mediation rules’, paper presented at the arbitration 
and mediation conference, May 11 – 12, Austin, Texas. (Unpublished). 
o C. Mark Baker, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: choosing the best process’ 
(2003) A paper presented at the arbitration and mediation conference, May 11 – 
12, Austin, Texas. (Unpublished) 
o C. Mark Baker, ‘Mediation: a valuable partner to international arbitration’ (A 
paper presented at the international dispute resolution seminar on 16th April 
2003, four seasons hotel, Austin, Texas). 
 
 
 
 
 98
o Cecil O. D. Branson Q. C, ‘Recent UNCITRAL Initiatives Relating to Arbitration 
and Conciliation’. Available on line at: http://www.texasadr.org/uncitral.cfm 
accessed on the 4th May 2005. 
o David Butler, ‘The South African Law Commission’s proposal for a New 
International Arbitration Act for South Africa to implement the UNCITRAL 
model law’ (1997) paper presented at an international conference in 
Johannesburg on 6th – 7th March 1997. 
o Derviard, ‘Resolution of international trade and investment disputes in Africa’ 
paper presented at an international conference in Johannesburg on 6th – 7th 
March 1997. 
o Earl Mclaren, ‘Effective use of international commercial arbitration: primer for 
in-house counsel’. Journal for international arbitration, vol. 19 No. 6 Pgs. 473 
(Kluwer law international, The Hague, The Netherlands, October 2002). 
o Elena V. Helmer, ‘International commercial arbitration: Americanized, civilized 
or harmonized?’ Ohio Journal on Dispute settlement, (2003). 
o Eric Van Ginkel, ‘The UNCITRAL model law in international commercial 
conciliation: A critical Appraisal’, 21. J. I. NT.’ L. A. RB. 1 (2004). 
o Fabian Von Schlabrendorff, ‘Resolving cultural differences in arbitration 
proceedings’ international financial review, Pg. 38 (Euro money institutional 
investor, London, England, March 2002). 
o Frederic Eisemann, ‘Conciliation as a means of settlement of international 
business disputes: the uncitral rules compared with the ICC system’ published in 
the ‘Art of arbitration’ edited by Jan C Schultsz and Albert Jan Van Den Berg, 
Deventer: kluwer, 1982. 
o Freedberg J.A, ‘uncitral working group on arbitration’, International Law forum 
du droit international; Feb 2001, vol 3 Issue 1, p62, 2p. 
o Gerald Aksen, ‘The Iran – U.S claims tribunal and the UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules – an early comment.’ (1982) Published in ‘Art of arbitration’ edited by Jan 
C. Schultsz and Albert Jan Van Den Berg, (Deventer: Kluwer). 
 
 
 
 
 99
o H Camp, Jr, ‘Binding Arbitration: A preferred alternative for resolving 
commercial disputes between Mexican and U.S businessmen, 22 St. Mary’s L.J 
717, 724 (1991). 
o Hans Smit, ‘The future of international commercial arbitration: A single 
transnational institution? 25 Colum. J. Tran Nat’l L. 9, 9 (1986). 
o John P Bowman, ‘Dispute resolution with host governments: What the 
international petroleum negotiator should know’, (2003) A paper presented at the 
arbitration and mediation conference, May 11 – 12, Austin, Texas. (Unpublished). 
o John P. Bowman, ‘Compelling Arbitration in International Cases’ (2003) A paper 
presented at the arbitration and mediation conference, May 11 – 12, Austin, 
Texas. (Unpublished). 
o Julie Baker, ‘International mediation … a better alternative for resolution of 
commercial disputes: Guidelines for US negotiators involved in an international 
commercial mediation with the Mexicans’ 19 Loy. L.A int’l comp. L.J (1996). 
o K. G Mujawdiya, ‘Best way to resolve business disputes: An opportunity for 
chartered accountants in practice’, (2002) The chartered Accountant. Available 
online at: http://www.icai.org/pdf/p173-175.pdf accessed on 03rd Nov. 2005. 
o Mark Baker, Fulbright & Jaworski, ‘The corporate representative and ADR’, 
International Commercial Litigation, September 1997. 
o Mark W. Friedman, et al, ‘developments in international commercial dispute 
resolution in 2003’ 38 int’l law 265. 
o Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘International dispute settlement’ 3 (2003). 
o Neil Kaplan, ‘Is the need for writing as expressed in the New York convention 
and the model law out of step with commercial practice? 12 Arb. Int’l 27 (1996). 
o Opening speech at UNCITRAL’s 33rd session by the under secretary for legal 
affairs, Hans Correll on the 12th June 2000.Available on line at: 
http://www.un.org/law/counsel/uncitral.htm accessed on the 13th April 2005. 
o Pierre Lalive, ‘Some observations in the internationalization of international 
arbitration: the LCIA centenary conference 52 (Martin Hunter et al. Eds, 1993). 
 
 
 
 
 100
o Pieter Sanders, ‘UNCITRAL’s model law on conciliation’ International Journal 
of Dispute Settlement, vol. 12/2002, Pg. 1 (Verlag Retchund wirtschaft, 
Heidelberg, 2000). 
o President Jimmy Carter, Jackson H Ralston Lecture: Principles of negotiation 
(1987) 23 Stan. J int’l L 2. 
o Rau and Sherman, ‘Tradition and innovation in international arbitration 
procedure’, 30 Tex. Int’l L. J 89 at 91. 
o RH Christie, ‘The UNCITRAL model law and the powers of the courts: A South 
African perspective’ (1999). 
o Richard Hill, ‘Primer on international arbitration’ 1995 available on line at 
http://www.batnet.com/oikoumene/arbprim.html. 
o Robert Coulson, ‘The future growth of institutional administration in international 
commercial arbitration’, published in the ‘Art of arbitration’ edited by Jan C 
Schultsz and Albert Jan Van Den Berg, Deventer: kluwer, 1982. 
o SA law commission, ‘Arbitration: A draft arbitration Act for South Africa’ 
discussion paper 69. 
o Shapira, ‘UNCITRAL and its work – Harmonisation and unification of 
international trade law’, (1992) New Zealand Law Journal. 
o Thomas J. DiLorenzo, ‘The Origins of Antitrust: Rhetoric vs. Reality’, published 
in The Cato Review of Business & Government, accessible on line at: 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv13n3/reg13n3-dilorenzo.html 
o Tobi P. Dress, ‘International commercial mediation and conciliation.’ 10 LOY. 
L.A int & comp Law Journal 575 (1988). 
o Toby Landau, ‘The requirement of a written form of arbitration agreement’ (A 
paper presented at the 16th ICCA congress, may 12 – 15, 2002). 
o UNCTAD, ‘Dispute settlement: International commercial arbitration’2005, 
publication on making of the award and termination of proceedings at pg. 24. 
Published at www.unctad.org on 08th October 2005. 
o Vinod K. Agarwal, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods’, (Document No. 14, 
Chapter 1 March 2002) available online at: 
 
 
 
 
 101
http://www.unitar.org/dfm/Resource_Center/Document_Series/Document14/Agar
wal/4conciliation.htm. 
o William W. Park, ‘The arbitrability dicta in first options v. Kaplan: what sort of 
Kompetenz – Kompetenz has crossed the Atlantic? 12 ARB. INT’L 137 (1996) 
reprinted in 11 INT’L ARB. REP. 28 (Oct. 1996). 
o William W. Park, Determining arbitral jurisdiction: Allocation of tasks between 
courts and arbitrators’, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133 (1997), reprinted in ARB and 
DISPUTE law journal 19(Mar 2000). 
 
LEGISLATION 
o Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2000, Cap 4, Laws of Uganda. 
o Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China 
o Hong Kong Arbitration (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance, 1989. 
o Korean arbitration rules of the Korean commercial arbitration board, as amended 
on 14 December 1993). 
o South African Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act, 32 of 1988 
o South African Protection of Business Act 99 of 1978. 
o South African Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act 40 
of 1977. 
o The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 1890. 
 
CASE LAW 
o American safety equipment corp. v. Maguire (J.P) & co 391 F.2d 821 (2d) cir 
(1968). 
o Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & co. 579 F.2d 691 [1978]. 
o Channel Tunnel Group ltd. V. Balfour Beatty constructions ltd [1993] AC 334. 
o China Nanhai oil joint service cpn v. Gee Tai holdings co ltd Yearbook XX 
(1995) pg. 671. 
o China Nanhai oil joint service cpn v. Gee Tai holdings co. ltd Yearbook XX 
(1995) Pg 671 
o Chinatex Oriental co. v. Erskine 1998 (4) SA 1087 (c). 
 
 
 
 
 102
o Chromalloy Aero services Inc v. Arab Republic of Egypt 939 F. Supp. 907 
(D.D.C. 1996). 
o Compagnie de navigation et Transport SA v. MSC (Mediterranean shipping co) 
year book XXI (1996) at 697. 
o Compania Naviera SA of Panama v. Mabanaft GMBH (“The Dominos”) [1971] 2 
QB 588, [1971] 2 ALL ER 1301. 
o Concourse village, Inc v. Local 32 F, service employees international union, 882 
F.2nd 302, 304 (2d cir. 1987). 
o DIETF v. RF AG (5 July 1994) yearbook XXI (1996) at 685. 
o Eden v. Pienaar 2001 (1) SA 158 (w). 
o Fertilizer corpn of India (FCI) v. IDI management Inc, yearbook VII (1982) Pg. 
382. 
o Fougerolle SA v. Ministry of defence of the Syrian Arab Republic Yearbook 1990, 
515. 
o Fung Sang Trading co. ltd v Kai sun sea products & food co. ltd 1991 MP 2674. 
o Generica Limited v. Pharmaceuticals Basis Inc U.S. court of appeals, seventh 
circuit, 29 September 1997. No. 96 – 4004. 
o Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] C.P. Rep 34. 
o Harbour Assurance co (UK) v. Kansa (unreported)  
o Heyman v. Darwing [1942] AC 356. 
o Hilmarton ltd v. OTV, Year book XX (1995) Pg. 663. 
o Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.ED. (1895) 
o Hiscox v. Outhwaite [1991] 3 ALL ER 641; 1991 3 W.L.R 297. 
o Hoteles Condado Beach, 763 F.2d at 38. 
o Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch Foster Corporation, year book II 
(1977) Pg. 252. 
o Interdesco v. Nullifire Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 190. 
o Jones v. Krok 1996 (1) SA 504 (T). 
o Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc v. Lark International limited 186 F.3d 210 (2d cir. 
1999). 
 
 
 
 
 103
o Mavromattis Palestine concessions (Greece v. U.K) 1924 P.C.I.J ser. A no.2 at 
11. 
o Mind Star Toys Inc v. Samsung ltd citing Rio Algom ltd v. sammi steel co. (1991) 
47 C.P.C (2nd) 251 (Ont. Gen. Div). 
o Mitsubishi motors corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc 473 U.S. 614; 105 S.Ct. 
3346; 87 Led. 2d 444 (1988). 
o Oonc lines limited v. Sino – American trade advancement co. ltd In the supreme 
court of Hong Kong, High court miscellaneous proceedings no. 50/94 
o Pacific Int. lines (pte) ltd and another v. Tsinlien metals and minerals co. ltd 
Published in English in 1992, Hong Kong law digest 5 excepts of the judgment 
can be found in arbitration and dispute resolution journal, part 4, December 
1992, 240, [1993] 2 HKLR 249. 
o Parsons &whittemore overseas co. Inc v. societe Generale del industrie du papier 
(RAKTA) 508 F.2d 969 (2d cir. 1974). 
o Pennzoil expl. & Production company v. Ramco energy ltd 139 F.3d 1061, 1067 
(fifth cir. 1998). 
o Re Anonymous 283 F.3d 627. 
o RM investments & trading co. pvt ltd v. Boeing co. Supreme Court journal, 1994 
vol. 1 pg 657. 
o Sesostris v. Transportes Navales 727 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass. 1989). 
o  Seton Co v. Silveroak Industries Ltd 2000 (2) SA 215 at 229. 
o Sigval Bergesen v. Joseph Muller AG, U.S. ct App. 2nd cir 17 June 1983, 548 F 
supp. 650 (1982) 38 Arb. J. 70 (1983). 
o Societe d investissement kal v. Taieb haddad Barret Cour de cassation [Supreme 
Court], 10 November 1993; see also yearbook XXIII (1998). 
o Soleimany v. Soleimany [1999] 3 ALL ER 847 (CA). 
o Southern Pacific Properties ltd v. The Arab Republic of Egypt & the Egyptian 
general co. for Tourism and hotels 1. L.M 752 (1983). 
o Sphere Drake insurance PLC v. Marine Towing Inc, cited in yearbook XX (1995) 
at 937. 
o Sphere Drake, Ins. v. Marine Towing, Inc 16 F.3d 666 (fifth circuit, 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 104
o The Bremen v. Zapata case 407 U.S. 1; 92 S.Ct 1907; 32 L. ED. 2d 513(1972). 
o Tradex Ocean Transportation SA v. MV Silvergate (or Astyanax) and others 1994 
(4) SA 119 (D) 
WEBSITES 
o http://www.un.org/law/counsel/uncitral.htm. 
o http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/186. 
o http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.htm. 
o http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/negotiation. 
o http://www.batnet.com/oikoumene/arbprim.html. 
o http://projects.vassar.edu/1896/trusts.html. 
o http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv13n3/reg13n3-dilorenzo.html 
 
UNCITRAL INSTRUMENTS. 
 
o Guide to enactment and use of the UNCITRAL model law on international 
commercial conciliation, 2002. 
o Guide to enactment and use of the UNCITRAL model law on international 
commercial arbitration, 1976. 
 
o New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 1958. 
o Recommendations to assist arbitral institutions and other interested bodies with 
regard to arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 1982. 
o UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 1976. 
o UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, 1980. 
o UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985. 
o  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, 2002. 
o UNCITRAL Notes on Organising Arbitral Proceedings, 1996. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
